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ESSAYS ON BIOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Much of biology, especially evolutionary theory, makes assumptions about the individuality of 
living things. A population, for example, is made up of individuals. Those individuals sometimes 
reproduce, creating new individuals. The very use of these concepts requires that living individuals 
can be distinguished both synchronically and diachronically. There are many examples in nature, 
however, in which a living system is present, but it is not clear how to understand that system’s 
individuality. Plants, fungi, colonial marine invertebrates, insect colonies, and symbiosis are all classic 
cases that have puzzled biologists interested in understanding their population structure and 
evolution. Scientific exploration of these issues has connections with traditional philosophical 
terrain, particularly the ontology of persistence and the nature of individuality broadly construed. A 
biologically informed philosophical literature has arisen in recent years, aimed at understanding the 
nature of biological individuality and its role in biological theorizing. 
My dissertation makes two kinds of contributions to this current literature. One contribution is 
theoretical, reframing our thinking about biological individuality. I distinguish between two 
categories of individuality and argue that they play different roles in theorizing about nature. One 
important kind of individual is that of the organism, understood as an entity that persists through 
space and time, takes in and processes resources from the environment, and maintains physiological 
autonomy. Another important kind of individual is that of the evolutionary individual, understood 
as an entity that has the capacity to participate in processes of natural selection. Distinguishing iv 
between these two types of individuality has theoretical utility, keeping clear the distinctive kinds of 
biological processes that individuals engage in. The other contribution of my dissertation involves 
detailed natural historical analysis of three kinds of problem cases. Using the framework articulated 
earlier in the dissertation, I assess the individuality of symbioses between larger organisms and their 
microbial associates, mushroom-producing fungi, and the classic case of ant colonies. The combined 
result of the assessments is a hierarchical pluralism about biological individuality. 
   v 
 
 
CONTENTS 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................. iii 
Acknowledgements  ...........................................................................................................................................  vi 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................  1 
Essay One: On the Theoretical Roles of Biological Individuality 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................  5 
2. Individuals and Organisms in History and Today .........................................................................  6 
3. Evolutionary Individuals and Organism-individuals  ...................................................................10 
4. Relation to Other Contemporary Accounts .................................................................................16 
5. Two Theoretical Roles of Biological Individuality ......................................................................22 
Essay Two: Symbiosis, Selection, and Individuality 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................26 
2. Holobionts: An Introduction .........................................................................................................27 
3. Holobionts As Units of Selection .................................................................................................33 
4. Selection, Reproduction, and Lineages .........................................................................................35 
5. Interactors and the Possibility of Pluralism .................................................................................44 
Essay Three: Populations and Individuals in Heterokaryotic Fungi 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................49 
2. Evolution and Individuality/Darwinian Individuals ...................................................................50 
3. Heterokaryotic Fungi and Darwinian Populations ......................................................................54 
4. Moving Beyond the Minimal Concept ..........................................................................................66 
Essay Four: Individuality and the Attine Leaf Cutter Ants 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................75 
2. The Superorganism Framework .....................................................................................................75 
3. Two Kinds of Individuality ............................................................................................................83 
4. The Higher Attines ..........................................................................................................................85 
References .........................................................................................................................................................  96 
 
 
 vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my very great appreciation to my advisor, Peter Godfrey-Smith. He has been 
involved with this project from its inception and has been a major influence on all of its subsequent 
developments. His guidance has been invaluable. I would like to thank Anne Pringle for her many 
comments and critiques, and for inviting me to participate in the Pringle Lab meetings. Thanks to 
David Haig for much useful discussion, and for suggesting that I talk to Anne about some of my 
ideas. Thanks also to Ned Hall for helping steer me through this process. I am grateful for the 
assistance of the administrative staff in the Department of Philosophy at Harvard, especially that of 
Ruth Kolodney and Emily Ware. Very special thanks to Patrick Forber for both philosophical 
engagement and encouragement during the entirety of this project. Peter Koellner’s generosity was 
indispensable for the final phase. Finally, I’d like to express my love and gratitude to Emma and 
Nora for their patience and support. 
   vii 
 
 
 
 
 
To Dad – for believing in me 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “living individual” reflects two distinct and independent aspects of nature that can be 
subject to inquiry. On the one hand, there is a set of questions about what it is in virtue of which 
some entity might be considered an individual. Individuality is at its root a metaphysical or ontological 
issue, and is not necessarily or conceptually tied to the nature of the living. There are, after all, 
various individual entities that aren’t alive, such as rocks and electrons. Metaphysically minded 
philosophers may thus prefer to occupy themselves exclusively with the nature of individuality. How 
might we characterize individuality in its most basic, ontological sense? What can be said about the 
persistence of individuals over time? To turn to the other aspect of the phrase “living individual,” 
there are multiple questions that can raised about what it is in virtue of which something can rightly 
be said to be alive. What are the structures or processes that characterize life? Do living things 
exhibit a hierarchical structure? Must the parts of nature that are alive be individualized at all? 
Though the two aspects of living individuals are conceptually separate, they have often been 
blended and treated in tandem in the history of philosophy. Aristotle, for example, considered 
individual horses and individual men to be exemplars of primary substances, a category that is rooted 
squarely in metaphysics (Aristotle 1984, Cat. 1a20, 2a11). Another example can be found in Locke’s 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke was interested in the identity over time of an organism 
whose body is merely a collection of corpuscular matter at some time, but might be composed of 
entirely different corpuscular matter at a later time. What is it in virtue of which the organism can be 
said to be the same thing at the later time? Locke’s answer was to suggest that organisms are unified 
over time by a “life” (Locke 1979, II.xxvii.4). In each of these examples there is linkage between an 
ontological domain and the nature of the living. 2 
One needn’t agree with any specific claims made by Aristotle or Locke to see that a kind of 
blending of philosophical territory has occurred. This kind of blending happens so often because 
familiar macroscopic organisms are very salient parts of nature, and appear pretheoretically to be 
individuated entities, clearly distinct from their environment. Organisms have often been taken to be 
ontologically special or privileged. They are individual and independent beings, and in fact they 
exemplify these attributes. 
Early biologists were undoubtedly inclined to view organismality as a basic phenomenon, and to 
treat organismal parts and processes as the primary subjects of biological inquiry. As natural history 
and biological investigation became more detailed and sophisticated during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, however, those interested in the nature of organismality were faced with a 
variety of cases that did not seem to fit the standard mold. It started to become clear that living 
systems like colonial sea creatures, symbiotic organisms composed of fungi and algae (lichens), and 
even everyday plants do not yield easy answers to questions about their boundaries or individuality 
(see, e.g., T. H. Huxley 1852; Schwendener 1869; Schneider 1897). These are all cases in which there 
are unambiguously systems that are alive, but in which there is no small amount of ambiguity about 
how to understand the individuality of the living systems. 
The development of the theory of evolution and subsequent debate about the potentially 
hierarchical nature of the evolutionary process ensured that the issue of biological individuality 
would be a central one. This is so for two reasons. First, evolutionary explanation requires the 
individuation of organisms that constitute evolving populations. Second, evolutionary thinking 
introduces a diachronic perspective. Individuals are conceived as products of evolution, and can 
apparently be found at many levels of the biological hierarchy (both above and below the level of 
the organism). This raises obvious questions about how to conceptualize the evolution of individuality 3 
(J. Huxley 1912). What are the conditions under which new kinds of individuals evolve? What are 
the mechanisms responsible for evolution of this kind? 
Contemporary philosophical discussion of biological individuality tends to be firmly rooted in 
science and is most often guided by biological theory. This is an area, of course, in which the 
biology is often tangled together with more foundational philosophical issues. However, the kinds 
of philosophical questions that occupied thinkers like Aristotle and Locke have largely been 
sidelined and are not central in today’s philosophy of biology (though they are still discussed in 
other areas of philosophy). An evolutionary approach to biological individuality is undoubtedly the 
dominant one in most contemporary discussions (see, e.g., Hull 1980; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Queller 
and Strassmann 2009; Clarke 2011a), though there are exceptions (Pradeu 2012; Haber 2013). 
This dissertation is not unusual with respect to the adoption of a biological theoretical stance 
toward the subject of the individuality of living things. There is some engagement with the history 
of biology and philosophy, though history is largely peripheral to the main project. Instead, the 
dissertation focuses on how the concerns of contemporary biological theorizing might motivate the 
questions we ask and the frameworks we use regarding the conceptualization of biological 
individuality, and how the resources of biological theory conjoined with natural history can be 
deployed to say something substantive about individuality in specific cases of interest. The 
dissertation comprises four essays, all dealing with some aspect of the theme of biological 
individuality. The first essay, “On the Theoretical Roles of Biological Individuality,” introduces a 
large-scale framework that motivates and taxonomizes the multiple theoretical roles that biological 
individuality might play in philosophical and scientific contexts. The subsequent three essays are 
detailed applications to specific cases of some aspect of the framework developed in the first essay. 
The second essay, “Symbiosis, Selection, and Individuality,” deals with the evolution of symbiotic 
relationships between multicellular organisms and their ubiquitous microbial partners. The essay has 4 
been published in the journal Biology and Philosophy (Booth 2014a). The third essay, “Populations and 
Individuals in Heterokaryotic Fungi: A Multilevel Perspective,” engages with an interesting problem 
case: the familiar mushroom-producing fungi. The essay articulates a coherent view for thinking 
about populations of fungi, a project that has been influenced by close consideration of the 
concerns of mycologists. The essay has been published in Philosophy of  Science (Booth 2014b). The 
fourth and final essay concerns a classic case: ant colonies. It is titled “Individuality and the Attine 
Leaf Cutter Ants.” The essay focuses on the natural history of the higher attine ants and their 
symbiotic relationship with their cultivated fungus, arguing that the ant colony, including the fungus, 
is a selectable organism. Taken together, the essays constitute a naturalistic, theoretically guided 
approach to various aspects of the contemporary philosophical issue of biological individuality. 
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ESSAY ONE: ON THE THEORETICAL ROLES OF BIOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALITY 
1.  Introduction 
In an article entitled “Individual” in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology, David Hull asked an important 
question: “A continuing problem in philosophy is to find some principled way to distinguish 
between all the welter of classes that clutter our conceptual landscapes and some set of privileged 
classes, commonly termed natural kinds. A parallel problem exists for individuals. Out of the welter 
of individuals that clutter our conceptual landscapes, how are we to pick out ‘natural’ individuals” 
(1992, 183)? Hull’s question can be regarded as a general metaphysical one, although he was 
primarily interested in biological individuals. When confronted with the astonishing diversity of the 
living world, how are we to determine the boundaries of individual entities? 
A naturalistic philosophical response to Hull’s question, and indeed Hull’s actual response, is to 
say that we get a handle on biological individuality only upon examination of our biological theories. 
Hull, however, argued that biological theory is limited in ways that are relevant to our understanding 
of biological individuality: “Biologists have been engaged in the study of anatomy and physiology 
for centuries, but no ‘theories’ of morphology and physiology have materialized in the same sense 
that evolutionary theory is a ‘theory.’ In order to see the dependence of individuality on theories, 
one must investigate more highly articulated areas such as evolutionary biology” (1992, 184). I 
believe that there is room to disagree with Hull’s claims about the theoretical limitations of other 
branches of biology and their explanatory practices. 
This essay is a defense of an approach to the issue of biological individuality that is rooted in 
just such a disagreement. My key claim is that there are two roles for the category of the individual 6 
in biological contexts. I propose a bifurcation of the category of the individual into two: Darwinian 
individuals and organism-individuals. I argue that these categories characterize two essentially 
distinct kinds of things, and that each category is rooted in different explanatory practices that are 
commonly found in biology and philosophy. The category of the Darwinian individual arises from 
the explanatory requirements of evolutionary theory. Contra Hull, however, explanations associated 
with other branches of biology, such as immunology, developmental biology, and physiology, do 
provide the basis for a category of biological individual: the organism-individual. 
The organization of the essay is as follows. In Section 2 I examine a historical dispute about 
biological individuality, and suggest that what underlies the dispute is a tacit pluralism about 
biological individuality. I suggest that today’s debate is suffering from an ailment of a kind similar to 
the one I diagnose in the historical case. I offer a cure for this ailment: an explicit pluralist position 
about biological individuality. In Section 3 I describe the kind of pluralism that I have in mind. I 
introduce and characterize two categories of biological individuality: Darwinian individuals and 
organism-individuals. Section 4 discusses and compares my framework to two other contemporary 
accounts of individuality. Finally, in section 5 I demonstrate the utility of the theoretical roles of the 
two categories in biological theory. I apply the categories to various systems in which they 
individuate distinct and theoretically important biological entities. 
2.  Individuals and Organisms in History and Today 
In 1852, T. H. Huxley articulated a theoretical perspective on individuality in animals, arguing that, 
“The individual animal is the sum of the phenomena presented by a single life: in other words, it is, 
all those animal forms which proceed from a single egg taken together” (1852, 149–50). Sixty years 
later, Julian Huxley pointed out what he believed to be the absurdity of his grandfather’s position by 
focusing on its implications about monozygotic human twins: “If anything is an individual on this 7 
earth, that surely is man; and yet we are asked to believe that though the most of us are true 
individuals, yet here and there some man who lives and moves and has his being like the rest is none, 
that he must make shift to share an individuality with another man simply because the couple 
happen to be descended from one fertilized egg instead of two” (1912, 70). 
The dispute between these two biologists of old is representative of a kind of tension in the 
category of the individual that can be found in contemporary discussion of these issues. The 
tension is underwritten by the observation that there are two concepts of individuality at play in the 
disagreement between the Huxleys. T. H. Huxley proposed a category of biological individuality, 
characterized as all the biotic products of a single sexual event. However, he perfectly well 
understood this kind of entity to be sometimes distinct from the category of a physiologically 
integrated entity. Huxley recognized that, in certain instances, the biological product of a single 
sexual event consists of parts that are not physiologically integrated with one another, and may not 
even be in physical contact with one another, as happens in various colonial marine invertebrates 
that are the subject of his essay. Huxley’s paper antedates Darwin’s Origin by several years. The role 
that Huxley’s individuals are meant to play in biological processes or theories is not entirely clear, 
though Huxley’s position on individuality is arguably the ancestor of a family of explicitly 
evolutionary descendants, which treat the products of sexual events as units of selection (see Janzen 
1977).
1 
For Julian Huxley, the suggestion that there are individuals consisting of many physiological 
separate modules was to be rejected outright, as the case of monozygotic twins is supposed to 
demonstrate. He was operating with a fundamentally different conception of the role that the 
category of the individual should play in biological thought. Julian Huxley was convinced that a 
physiologically discrete human being is an individual, even if that human being happens to have the 
                                                 
1 I discuss this family of views in more detail below. 8 
same unicellular origin as her twin. He was thus conceiving of the category of the individual as one 
that picks out primarily physiologically unified or integrated entities, entities akin to what are 
traditionally called organisms. 
Much time has passed since Julian Huxley took his grandfather to task about his conception of 
individuality, and our biological understanding of the world has changed dramatically in that time. 
The details of the two contrasting historical views will therefore not be my primary concern here. 
Instead, my suggestion is that a lesson can be learned from examining the dispute between the 
Huxleys. The disagreement makes plain the plausibility that there can be more than one legitimate 
role for the category of the individual in biological discourse. T. H. Huxley conceived of an 
individual as something that is potentially larger than, or more inclusive than, an individual 
physiology, an individual organism. Whatever the theoretical role that Huxley envisioned would be 
played by these kinds of individuals, it is clearly not the theoretical role that is played by 
physiologically independent entities, at least not all the time. There is, however, no prima facie 
reason to deny that two kinds of biological individuality might have a legitimate role to play in 
biological processes and our representations of those processes. T. H. Huxley recognized the need 
in his own thinking of a role for entities akin to the type his grandson identified as individuals: 
“When the forms of the individual are independent it becomes desirable to have a special name by 
which we may denote them so as to avoid the incessant ambiguity of the two senses of the word 
individual” (1852, 189). The “special name” he chose was “Zöoid”, a term still in use among marine 
biologists. Thus, T. H. Huxley, without any inconsistency, chose to include physiologically discrete, 
organism-like entities in his biological ontology. He just chose not to call them “individuals,” at least 
in cases in which the development of an egg leads to many physiologically discreet zooids. 
Julian Huxley was in some sense talking past his predecessor, insisting on one unified solution to 
one set of issues associated with the individuation of biological entities. The dispute could in 9 
principle have been resolved with the adoption of a kind of pluralism about biological individuality 
and an overarching theoretical framework supporting different roles for each of the categories of 
individual. I suggest that recognition of this potential resolution of the historical disagreement can 
be brought usefully to bear on contemporary discussion about the nature of biological individuality. 
Let us turn to the state of play in today’s literature. Contemporary theorists in both biology and 
philosophy often make no distinction between organisms and individuals. A recent paper addressing 
the issue of whether a substantive organism concept is needed in biology is indicative: “among 
biologists, the question of what constitutes an individual is usually identical with the question of 
what constitutes an individual organism” (Pepper and Herron 2008, 622). Much of the current 
thinking in this area implicitly assumes a perspective according to which questions about the nature 
of biological individuality in general are taken to be intimately connected with questions about the 
nature of organismality, though not everybody agrees on the details (cf. Buss 1987; Folse and 
Roughgarden 2010; Pradeu 2010; Queller and Strassmann 2009; R. A. Wilson 2008). 
One consequence of treating questions about the nature of individuality and questions about 
the nature of organismality in tandem is that theorists may thereby be led to expect there to be a 
unified problem of biological individuality, and hence one corresponding solution to the problem. There are 
various current approaches to the issue of biological individuality that exemplify this tendency. In a 
recent paper, for example, Clarke formulates what she sees as the problem of biological individuality, 
an issue fundamentally about demography in populational contexts, and argues that an urgent 
solution to the problem is needed (2011a). Rob Wilson articulates a unified and monistic perspective 
on biological individuality, starting and abstracting from the paradigmatic case of the individual 
organism (R. A. Wilson 2008). I believe that a one-size-fits-all approach to questions about the 
nature of biological individuality is unnecessarily limiting. To insist that there is one overarching, 
unified approach that can account for all issues relevant to biological individuality distorts the fact 10 
that there have tended to be two natural roles for the category of the biological individual at various 
points in the history of thinking about these issues. A monistic approach may result in the blurring 
together of two fundamentally distinct categories that I believe can and should be understood 
separately from one another. Insistence that putative accounts of the nature of biological 
individuality must necessarily begin with or be closely associated with the phenomenon of 
organismality potentially falls prey to T. H. Huxley’s “incessant ambiguity of the two senses of the 
word individual.” 
3.  Evolutionary Individuals and Organism-individuals 
In this section, I argue that there really are two legitimate categories that play important and distinct 
roles in biology and I outline the features of each category. 
Some distinguish between evolutionary biology and non-evolutionary branches of biology 
whose subject matter and modes of explanation are different in character (Mayr 1961; Hull 1992; 
Pradeu 2010; Tinbergen 1963). The non-evolutionary biosciences are said to include fields like 
developmental biology, physiology, and immunology. Insisting on a hard distinction between 
evolutionary and non-evolutionary biosciences is ultimately unnecessary and does not reflect the 
attitude of most contemporary biologists. However, I agree that in many biological contexts an 
evolutionary perspective is optional and that the kinds of explanations often sought in branches of 
biology like immunology and physiology are distinctive. Evolutionary biology is at least partly in the 
business of giving explanations of the distribution of features of populations. Other branches of 
biology, by contrast, seek to understand living systems in terms of explanations that are mechanistic 
in character, often with no evolutionary overtones whatsoever. It is possible, for example, to 
understand the mechanisms underlying some aspect of an organism’s physiology or development 
without knowing anything about the organism’s origin or evolutionary history (Mayr 1961; 11 
Tinbergen 1963). It is possible to gain an understanding of how a particular physiologically discrete 
system maintains homeostasis without knowing anything about what population the system is a part 
of, or how the system evolved. I think that the distinction between evolutionary and non-
evolutionary explanation is crucial for understanding what our biological theories tell us about the 
nature of individuality and its role in biological theorizing. The core idea of this essay, that there are 
two fundamental categories of biological individuality, is rooted in the distinction between these two 
broad types of biological explanation. 
A criterion of individuality is indispensible in contexts of Darwinian evolutionary explanation. 
Evolutionists are obliged to perform certain counting operations when doing their business. A 
population biologist must not only be able to distinguish individuals in a population from their 
neighbors synchronically; fitness calculations also require the ability to distinguish parents from their 
offspring diachronically. Counting individuals is thus essential to doing the kind of demographic 
work required for evolutionary explanation (Clarke 2011a; Godfrey-Smith 2009). Many biologists 
and philosophers have been led to the conclusion that there is a certain category of biological 
individual, what I will call the category of the evolutionary individual, that necessarily arises in the 
context of evolutionary explanation. There are contrasting approaches to explicating the category of 
the evolutionary individual. However, any particular account of evolutionary individuality will be 
linked to a particular account of Darwinian theory. 
There are two well-known families of foundational analyses of the process of evolution by 
natural selection that continue to be discussed by biologists and philosophers. One family of 
modern foundational accounts of selection was articulated by Lewontin (1970), and has recently 
been helpfully updated and rearticulated by Godfrey-Smith (2007; 2009). Central to Godfrey-Smith’s 
view is the idea of a Darwinian population: “A Darwinian population in the minimal sense is a collection 
of causally connected individual things in which there is variation in character, which leads to 12 
differences in reproductive output (differences in how much or how quickly individuals reproduce), 
and which is inherited to some extent” (2009, 39). Godfrey-Smith maintains that Darwinian 
populations tend to evolve by the process of natural selection, and that analysis of such populations 
is the proper way to gain a general understanding of the process of selection. Once the concept of a 
Darwinian population has been developed, a derivative concept of a Darwinian individual is 
articulated. A Darwinian individual is, “any member of a Darwinian population” (Godfrey-Smith 
2009, 40). Godfrey-Smith’s depiction of Darwinian individuals is similar in many respects to 
Lewontin’s view on units of selection, but one respect stands out; Darwinian individuals can be 
entities at any level of the biological hierarchy, so long as they are in principle capable of  reproduction. The 
Darwinian individual category understood in this way includes genes, organelles, cells, organisms, 
collectives of certain kinds, and perhaps even species. 
Another foundational approach to representing the process of natural selection is the replicator 
approach, originally articulated by Dawkins (1976/2006) and later amended by Hull (1980; Hull, 
Langman, and Glenn 2001). The central idea behind the replicator views is that two functional roles 
must be filled for any process of natural selection to occur. One is the role of the replicator, which 
is abstracted from a gene’s role in selection processes. A replicator is any entity that makes high-
fidelity copies of itself and causally affects phenotypes. Selection processes also require some entity 
to play the role of vehicle or interactor.
2 The vehicle or interactor concept is abstracted from an 
organism’s role in selection processes; they are phenotypic entities that interact with the 
environment and that thereby influence whether or not the replicators that ride inside them will be 
represented in the next generation. 
                                                 
2 Dawkins coined the term “vehicle”; Hull preferred “interactor.” The terms are similar, but not equivalent. The 
differences between vehicles and interactors is not required for the arguments in this paper. For a good discussion of the 
differences, and of replicator accounts in general, see Sterelny and Griffiths (1999, chap. 3). 13 
Hull maintains that replicators and interactors are both evolutionarily relevant individuals (1980; 
1992). The replicator account thus provides a coherent way to understand evolutionary individuality. 
Any time the process of natural selection is at work on a population, there will be biological 
individuals playing the role of replicators, and biological individuals playing the role of vehicles or 
interactors. The entities playing each role have an equal claim to being evolutionary individuals, 
because each is required for Darwinian processes to occur. According to the replicator account of 
selection, biological individuals can be found at various levels of the hierarchy. Genes are typically 
the entities playing the replicator role, but vehicles or interactors can be cells, organisms, or even 
collectives at still higher levels. 
There continues to be active debate between adherents of the two families of foundational 
accounts of natural selection (see Sterelny 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2011b). Nevertheless, there is 
consensus that Darwinians of any stripe will be required to say something, either implicitly or 
explicitly, about the category of the evolutionary individual. Discriminating and counting individuals 
is essential to the explanatory structure of the theory, no matter which foundational account is 
ultimately correct. There is a vast literature on these and related matters, canonically known as the 
“units of selection” or “levels of selection” issue (cf. Okasha 2006). Whichever view is ultimately 
accepted, it will provide a framework for answering Hull’s question about one theoretically important 
kind of natural individual, viz., those individuals that participate in Darwinian processes. 
Evolutionary individuals contrast with what I call organism-individuals. The category of the 
organism has traditionally been an important one in philosophical thought about the natural world. 
Historically, philosophers with no knowledge of the process of evolution by natural selection have 
been interested in characterizing the nature of living things. Some, like Aristotle and Kant, suggested 14 
that organisms have a unique metaphysical status as special kinds of individual entities.
3 The fact 
that such historical discussions were deemed worth pursuing is a good prima facie reason to think 
that there is a natural role to play for the concept of the organism in philosophy of biology, and one 
that is potentially independent of evolutionary theory. 
A good starting place for distinguishing between evolutionary individuals and organism-
individuals in a modern context is to distinguish between reproduction and persistence. Evolutionary 
individuals are often fundamentally viewed as entities that are parts of evolving lineages. This means 
that Darwinian individuals must have the capacity to reproduce or replicate; they must have the 
capacity to create new entities that are distinct and independent from themselves. Reproduction is 
therefore sometimes said to be the essential feature of evolutionary individuality (cf. Godfrey-Smith 
2009; Hull 1980). However, understanding and explaining the persistence of individual living things 
is also an important part of biology. Biotic entities have parts that interact in very specific ways, 
enabling certain kinds of capacities. The activities and arrangements of parts result in, or are 
constitutive of, developmental, physiological, and immunological processes of individuals. Some 
types of explanation in biology reflect these causal facts, and lead to understanding the capacities of 
wholes in terms of the activities of their parts (Cummins 1975; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
2000). These kinds of proximal explanations require individuation of  biological entities just as much as 
Darwinian explanations do. 
Proximal explanations about the activities of parts and their role in the persistence of wholes are 
not necessarily evolutionary in character (Amundson and Lauder 1994; Mayr 1961; Tinbergen 1963). 
For example, investigation of the mechanisms underlying the physiological or metabolic activities of 
an organized living system does not require knowledge about that system’s reproductive output. It 
                                                 
3 In Categories, for example, Aristotle suggests that horses and men are paradigmatic individual substances (Aristotle 
1984). Kant maintains that organisms are (or are akin to) what he calls “natural ends”, entities that are not, in principle, 
mechanically explicable (Kant 2001). 15 
does not require knowledge about what population the entity is part of. It does not necessarily 
require any knowledge about the origin of the entity whose capacities one aims to explain. So some 
patterns of explanation in biology do require individuation of parts and wholes, but not necessarily 
the individuation of any entities that are (potentially) participants in any type of Darwinian process. 
The individuals referred to in non-Darwinian explanatory contexts often have a very different role in 
natural processes than the ones represented in evolutionary contexts. But they are biological individuals 
nonetheless in the sense that they are entities (or processes) that are theoretically individuated as 
being important biologically. 
Persistence is not all that is essential to being an organism-individual. Various non-living 
particulars persist and various biological entities that aren’t organisms also persist. So something 
more must be said about what distinguishes organisms from other kinds of entities, both living and 
non-living. It is tempting to maintain that what distinguishes organisms from other kinds of natural 
systems is the degree of functional integration exhibited by their parts. Organisms are indeed 
functionally organized wholes, often with heterogeneous parts that work toward the capacity of the 
whole to achieve various ends. Some philosophers have argued that functional integration is too 
vague a notion to undergird a robust biological account of organismality or individuality (Clarke 
2011a; Pradeu 2010). I agree. Functional integration cannot be all that distinguishes organisms from 
non-living entities. There are many functionally integrated entities that aren’t organisms, like artifacts, 
or that are parts of organisms, like cells or organs. 
One strategy for characterizing the nature of organismality is to suggest that organisms exhibit 
special kinds of functional integration. For example, organisms may be regarded as essentially 
metabolically homeostatic and autonomous entities. Organisms are entities that take in nutrients and 
other sources of energy from outside themselves, that maintain their metabolic integrity in the face 16 
of fluctuating external conditions, that have parts that work toward the operation of the whole, and 
that exhibit some threshold of biotic independence (Thompson 2010). 
I suggest that the concepts of homeostasis and autonomy help to clarify the ways in which 
organisms differ from both complex non-living natural systems and from parts of living systems. 
Proximal, mechanistic biological theories and explanations make reference to various kinds of 
biological individuals, like organs, genes, T cells, or developmental modules. None of these 
individuals is capable of autonomous persistence, however. These individuals must be embedded in a 
larger system (an organism-like system) to perform their appropriate functional role. So though 
entities like organs or subsystems can be viewed as biological individuals, they can be helpfully 
distinguished from organism-individuals. 
The nature of organismality has very recently been examined by both biologists (Pepper and 
Herron 2008; Queller and Strassmann 2009; Folse and Roughgarden 2010) and philosophers 
(Pradeu 2010; 2012; R. A. Wilson 2008). It is notable that all of the biological articles cited above 
argue for an explicitly evolutionary understanding of the nature of organismality. My view provides a 
contrast. The organism-individual category can be understood in isolation from evolutionary 
considerations. This allows for a clear division of labor between theoretical roles for categories of 
individuality in biological practice. 
4.  Relation to Other Contemporary Accounts 
In this section, I look at two recent accounts of individuality and organismality that diverge from the 
framework articulated in the last section. The first, Queller and Strassmann’s account of 
organismality, treats one of my categories (that of reproducing evolutionary individuals) as in some 
sense fundamental. I argue that this understanding of organismality gives rise to some awkward 
consequences. There is no principled reason to maintain that reproduction is more fundamental 17 
than persistence and vice versa; the categories are separate but equal. The second account, 
Bouchard’s, is oriented around the idea that persistence is essential to understanding evolutionary 
phenomena, a view which is at odds with the framework I outlined in the last section. For the most 
part, I have no objection to Bouchard’s ideas, though there is a significant divergence in terminology. 
I provide a characterization of the phenomena that is of interest to Bouchard using my preferred 
language. 
The first characterization of organismality I will discuss is that of Queller and Strassmann in 
their important paper “Beyond society: the evolution of organismality.” There, the authors suggest 
that, “the organism is simply a unit with high cooperation and very low conflict among its parts” 
(2009, 3144). 
It is worth thinking about exactly what Queller and Strassmann have in mind when they use the 
concept of cooperation. One common scientific interpretation of cooperation is grounded in an 
explicitly evolutionary context. Biological entities cooperate when they engage in a fitness-affecting 
interaction that results in an increase of each of their fitnesses (West, Griffin, and Gardner 2007). 
Suppose that Queller and Strassmann are employing something like this concept of cooperation in 
their definition of organismality. In that case, a conceptual linking of cooperation to fitness has 
consequences for how we must think about organisms. Fitness is most often measured in terms of 
how many offspring an entity gives rise to and, as such, is directly tied to the act of reproduction. 
Cooperators, in virtue of being fitness-bearing entities, must be reproducers. Darwinian individuals 
are essentially reproducers (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Hence, if cooperators are fitness bearing, then 
cooperators must be Darwinian individuals. On this interpretation of Queller and Strassmann, the 
organism is a unit that has Darwinian individuals as cooperating or conflicting parts. 
It is not immediately clear that conceiving organisms in this way is an unwanted consequence. I 
would like to suggest, however, that Queller and Strassmann’s criterion of organismality, understood 18 
with this explicitly evolutionary grounding, gives rise to a potential problem about how organisms 
are identified. 
At this point one question to ask is whether Queller and Strassmann’s criterion entails that 
organisms can only have parts that are Darwinian individuals. This is surely too strong. Some 
organisms quite clearly have non-Darwinian parts. A human being has lungs as parts, for example. 
But lungs aren’t Darwinian individuals because they don’t reproduce. Lungs do tend to reliably recur 
in each generation, of course, but lungs are not themselves reproducing entities in the same way that 
a human being is. So it seems uncontroversial that organisms can have parts that are not Darwinian 
individuals. 
However, an application of Queller and Strassmann’s definition of organismality, conjoined with 
an evolutionarily grounded interpretation of cooperation, entails that organisms cannot have 
cooperating non-Darwinian parts. This takes some natural ways of thinking off the table. One would 
be prohibited from saying that an organism has certain kinds of cooperating subsystems as parts. 
For example, it would not be true to say that an organism can be understood in terms of a digestive 
system that cooperates with a respiratory system and a nervous system to maintain physiological 
integrity and homeostasis. These particular subsystems aren’t Darwinian individuals and hence 
cannot cooperate in an evolutionary sense that involves calculating their fitness. Characterizing 
organismality in this way may be awkward, but it is not necessarily a problem. Philosophers, after all, 
are fond of pointing out that sometimes, when scientific concepts and ideas are sharpened up, it 
turns out that we might have to begin using familiar terms in somewhat revisionist ways. That in 
itself is not a reason to think that characterizing organisms in terms of the cooperation of their 
parts is problematic. 
There is another way of making the worry appear deeper, however. Queller and Strassmann’s 
definition of organismality, when understood as endorsing a strict evolutionary reading of 19 
cooperation, has the consequence that the concept of an organism in some sense depends on the 
concept of a Darwinian individual. The criterion of organismality clearly depends upon Darwinian 
individuality definitionally. This may not be a problem. It is inevitable that certain biological 
concepts will be tied up together conceptually. But if definitional dependence is supposed to include 
something like epistemological dependence then a clear problem comes into view. It would turn out 
that in order to know how to identify organisms in nature, one would already have to know how to 
identify the Darwinian entities that are its parts. 
This does not seem like a reasonable thing to believe. In many cases, at least, it is possible to 
identify organisms without identifying the Darwinian units that make them up. Certain facts about 
the persistence, physiology, and development of individual organisms can be understood in isolation 
from evolutionary considerations. Making explicit the mechanisms of organismal development, for 
example, does not depend upon locating those mechanisms in a Darwinian populational context or 
calculating the fitness of the parts of the mechanisms or anything of the sort. Indeed, organismality 
as a phenomenon is compatible with various kinds of origin explanations. So an insistence on 
characterizing organisms as essentially being composed of cooperating entities, understood in an 
evolutionary sense, is not in accordance with certain strains of thinking and practice in organismal 
biology. It makes the identification of organisms depend upon first identifying the Darwinian units 
that make them up. However, it is possible to understand much about organismal functions without 
knowing anything about how their parts are located in a Darwinian population. 
It is possible, of course, that Queller and Strassmann don’t intend for their criterion of 
organismality to be interpreted using a sense of cooperation that is grounded in an evolutionary 
conceptual landscape. Elsewhere they write, “the essence of… organismality lies in this shared 
purpose; the parts work together for the integrated whole, with high cooperation and very low 
conflict” (2009, 3144). Tabling the mention of cooperation for the moment, Queller and 20 
Strassmann’s view here looks more like some accounts of organismality that are rooted in the 
functional integration of parts. Understanding organismality in that way does not require any 
reliance on an evolutionary theoretical apparatus. On this kind of view, organismality can be 
completely accounted for through an analysis of part whole relations and the contribution the parts 
make to the overall functioning of the organismal system. 
It is possible that Queller and Strassmann understand cooperation as a notion that can fit into 
this kind of framework. On this view, perhaps, cooperation involves a relationship that holds 
between parts that engage in activities for the purpose of enhancing the functional integration of 
some organismal whole.  
If this more low key understanding of cooperation is indeed the one that Queller and 
Strassmann have in mind, then this frees their criterion of organismality from any dependence upon 
evolutionary theoretical terms and ideas. Organismality can be understood through an analysis of 
the activities of parts and how those activities lead to the functional integration of wholes. 
Cooperation in this framework is not grounded in evolutionary details about fitness-affecting 
interactions, reproduction, or Darwinian populations. In fact, no evolutionary terms or ideas need to 
be on the table to fully understand the essential properties of organisms. The fact that organisms 
might be identified in a way that is not definitionally or epistemologically dependent upon prior 
knowledge of Darwinian individuals ought to be recognized as a feature of this kind of 
interpretation of cooperation and its role in making explicit a criterion of organismality. 
As it is, however, the role of cooperation in defining organismality, as articulated by Queller and 
Strassmann in, doesn’t disambiguate between the evolutionarily laden sense of cooperation and the 
sense that is more closely aligned with analyzing the functional integration of parts. I suggest that 
this ambiguity is important and that a closer look at the role the concept of cooperation plays in 
discussions of organismality is needed. What hinges on the sense of cooperation that is being 21 
deployed in attempts to understand organismality is nothing less than a deep philosophical issue 
concerning which theories in biology are taken to be fundamental in that domain. Which account of 
cooperation scientists ultimately rely on has ramifications for how they view the theoretical structure 
of organismal biology, and has epistemological ramifications for how organisms are to be identified 
in nature. Such ramifications warrant more discussion of the term and how it is being employed in 
current discussions of the nature of organisms. 
One other contemporary philosophical position deserves discussion in this section. Bouchard 
argues that differential reproduction of individuals in populations is not essential to the process of 
evolution by natural selection and that persistence of individuals and lineages is the key to 
understanding the evolutionarily central concept of fitness (2008; 2013). Bouchard’s view seems to 
map awkwardly onto the framework I present in this essay. I’ve argued that persistence is essential to 
organism-individuals, and that explanations relevant to the persistence of physiologically 
autonomous entities are non-evolutionary in character. Bouchard points out that various kinds of 
organism-individuals, like clonal plants, themselves evolve, as their parts exhibit variation in growth 
patterns that result in a fitter organism over time. He argues that persistence is therefore sufficient to 
underwrite certain instances of evolution by natural selection. On Bouchard’s view, persistence is 
being linked very specifically to Darwinian processes, and that seems to be a departure from my 
arguments in this essay. 
Evolution can occur among the parts of certain kinds of physiologically discrete entities, like 
plants and fungi (cf. Clarke 2011b; Booth 2014b). However, I think of this kind of selection as a 
population-level phenomenon occurring among populations of organism parts, such as cells or 
nuclei. A standard Darwinian story can be told about intraorganismal variation and selection; a 
wholesale reorganization of basic evolutionary concepts, like fitness, is not necessary (cf. Buss 1987). 
Cases of intraorganismal selection are interesting, however, because in many cases the relevant 22 
populations are not paradigmatic Darwinian populations (sensu Godfrey-Smith 2009) as there is 
limited variation among the parts (the case of fungi is discussed later in this dissertation; Booth 
2014b). There is also significant variation in clonal organisms in the degree to which their parts are 
physiologically connected. (Compare two trunks on different sides of a very expansive aspen grove 
to two individual hyphae in the mycelium of a small fungus, for example.) Cases in which organismal 
parts are very tightly integrated are potentially subject to a mechanistic causal analysis (Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver 2000). Cases of clonal reproduction and intraorganismal selection are therefore 
situations in which it is possible to conceive of an individual biological system as both a population 
of reproducing entities and as being composed of parts that causally interact to produce some 
capacity of an individual whole. It is possible, that is, to view a single biological system as being an 
organism-individual that is composed of many Darwinian individuals. 
Once again, the utility of keeping the two categories of biological individuality distinct is 
apparent. Biological individuals participate in various kinds of processes, and their theoretical status 
as individuals should reflect that. I now transition to the theoretical roles that different individuals 
play in biology. 
5.  Two Theoretical Roles of Biological Individuality 
In this section I explain why philosophy of biology is better off with the adoption of the two 
categories that I’ve articulated in this essay. In practice, the categories distinguish between 
theoretically relevant entities, ones that it is sometimes important to keep distinct. Consider clonally 
reproducing entities, like plants and fungi. Janzen’s well known view, a descendant of T. H. Huxley’s, 
posits that products of sexual events are evolutionarily relevant units, even in cases in which their 
parts are not physiologically or metabolically connected, as in dandelions and aphids (Janzen 1977). 
Janzen, however, suggests that a particular clone of physiologically discrete dandelion plants should 23 
be viewed as an organism, even though he recognizes that such a clone shares very few properties 
with organisms as traditionally conceived by biologists. Janzen is thus representative of the tendency 
to treat evolutionarily relevant units and organism units under one conceptual umbrella. 
The terminology that I’ve introduced in this essay is helpful here. Janzen’s view maintains that an 
entire dandelion clone is a Darwinian individual.
4 This larger Darwinian individual is, however, 
composed of autonomously persisting and physiologically integrated entities, what we would refer to 
in everyday parlance as plants. These entities are organism-individuals. It is thus possible to articulate 
Janzen’s distinction between Darwinian individuals and their parts without getting bogged down in a 
debate about which entities are the real biological individuals. Both kinds of entities, whole clones and 
the physiologically discrete plants that are their parts, can simultaneously be held to be real biological 
individuals, albeit ones that can play different roles in our theoretical understanding of the system. 
Some symbiotic systems also provide a good proving ground for the distinction between 
Darwinian individuals and organism-individuals. A group of biologists associated with the Human 
Microbiome Project has suggested that a human/microorganism collective can rightly be conceived 
as something akin to a multigenomic organism: “If humans are thought of as a composite of 
microbial and human cells, the human genetic landscape as an aggregate of the genes in the human 
genome and the microbiome, and human metabolic features as a blend of human and microbial 
traits, then the picture that emerges is one of a human ‘supraorganism’” (Turnbaugh et al. 2007, 
804). From the perspective of at least some biological fields, such as immunology, physiology, and 
developmental biology, it may be true that human beings include, as parts, their cooperative 
microorganismal symbiotic partners. Arguably a multigenomic entity of this type should be 
conceived only as an organism-individual and not as a Darwinian individual, however. The 
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physiologically and developmentally integrated multigenomic whole consists of various distinct 
Darwinian individuals that are parts of divergent Darwinian populations. Multigenomic consortia 
are not themselves reproducers, but consist of parts that independently reproduce. Nevertheless, as 
Turnbaugh et al. point out, there are biological reasons to distinguish human/microbe collectives as 
legitimate organismic individuals. They can consistently be treated as such without simultaneously 
being conceived as units of selection. Once again the categories of Darwinian individuality and 
organism-individuality identify different but equally important entities in symbiotic systems of this 
kind. 
Another type of entity that justifies the distinction between Darwinian individuality and 
organism-individuality is that of scaffolded reproducers (sensu Godfrey-Smith 2009, chap. 5). 
Scaffolded reproducers are entities that require biotic resources external to themselves in order to 
replicate. The quintessential examples of scaffolded reproducers are viruses and genes. There has 
been active debate about whether or not viruses are alive, and whether they are organisms in their 
own right (Dupré and O’Malley 2012a). This is at least partly because viruses are not autonomous 
metabolically active entities and cannot autonomously replicate themselves. The debate about viruses 
can thus helpfully be construed as one about whether or not viruses are organism-individuals. 
Viruses are unambiguously replicating entities that are parts of lineages; they are clear Darwinian 
individuals. Something similar can be said for genes. Genes are not metabolic agents at all, and 
cannot autonomously carry out their own replication. Hence they ought not to be conceived as 
organism-individuals. Genes are sometimes parts of evolving lineages, however, and as such are 
Darwinian individuals. 
There is utility in the bifurcation of biological individuality that I defend in this essay. A 
perspective according to which there is one unified problem of biological individuality and one 
solution to the problem might tempt someone to articulate a view according to which genes and 25 
humans and dandelion clones should all be lumped into one category, or according to which only 
one or two of these entities are really individuals and the others aren’t. However, biological 
individuals are diverse, and are potentially very different from one another in terms of their roles in 
natural processes. I suggest that any framework for addressing the issue of biological individuality 
should reflect this diversity. Biology is better off recognizing both Darwinian individuals and 
organism-individuals, “so as to avoid the incessant ambiguity of the two senses of the word 
individual.” 
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ESSAY TWO: SYMBIOSIS, SELECTION, AND INDIVIDUALITY 
1.  Introduction 
A recent development in biology has been the growing acceptance that symbiotic relationships 
between microbes and larger organisms (macrobes)
5 are widespread in nature, and that 
understanding such relationships is crucial if we wish to have an accurate picture of living systems 
on this planet. Part of the significance of the ubiquity of  symbiotic relationships between microbes 
and macrobes is that such systems are evolved outcomes. Accordingly, characterizing the nature of 
the evolutionary process as it applies to symbiotic collectives has acquired an urgency among 
biologists and philosophers of biology. Such characterizations are the subject of this essay. 
Some aspects of the evolution of symbiotic collectives are agreed upon by all. Unicellular 
prokaryotes (Bacteria and Archaea) had already undergone billions years of evolution and 
diversification before eukaryotic and eventually multicellular organisms evolved. The arrival and 
diversification of macrobes provided a proliferation of potential new habitats for microbial 
organisms. It is now understood that multicellular organisms have been involved in complex 
symbiotic relationships with microorganisms throughout their evolutionary history (Moran 2006). 
Symbiotic interactions between microbes and macrobes have been documented among many diverse 
organisms, and it is probable that all macrobes engage in symbiotic interactions with microbes in 
natural settings (Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008; Dupré and O’Malley 2012a; 2012b; Gordon 
et al. 2013; Singh et al. 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, not everybody agrees on the details of how to characterize the evolution and 
selection of symbiotic collectives comprised of microbes and macrobes. This essay is directed at 
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exploring the conceptual issues involved in the debate about whether symbiotic collectives are units 
of selection. Section 2 is primarily descriptive. I introduce the notion of a holobiont, an entity 
composed of a macrobial host and its symbiotic microbial associates. I provide some details about 
the basic biology of three well-understood holobiont systems. In Section 3, I briefly articulate some 
recent claims made by both biologists and philosophers of biology to the effect that holobiont 
collectives are units of selection. The aim of Sections 4 and 5 is to evaluate those claims in the light 
of two distinct foundational frameworks for understanding the process of natural selection: 
Godfrey-Smith’s Darwinian populations framework and the replicator/interactor framework. 
Though they differ with respect to their verdict about the evolutionary individuality of holobionts, 
the two frameworks yield pluralistic perspectives on biological individuality that are similar in some 
ways. 
2.  Holobionts: An Introduction 
A symbiotic collective composed of a macrobial organism and all of its associated microbes is 
sometimes called a holobiont. Mindell introduced the concept of a holobiont in the early nineties in a 
systematics context (1992; cf. Rosenberg 2013). As a result of the recent focus on microbial 
organisms and their role in the evolution, development, and physiology of host organisms, the use 
of the term has proliferated (for some recent examples see Gordon et al. 2013; Mandrioli and 
Manicardi 2013; Minard, Mavingui, and Moro 2013; Rosenberg 2013; Singh et al. 2013; Stat et al. 
2012). The concept of the holobiont is quite useful, as is the related idea of the hologenome. The 
hologenome is, “the sum of the genetic information of the host and its microbiota” (Zilber-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008, 723). Many researchers maintain that all macrobial living things 
have important relationships with microbes, and hence that holobionts are ubiquitous in nature 28 
(Moran 2006; Dupré and O’Malley 2012a; Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008; Gordon et al. 
2013; Singh et al. 2013). 
The aim of this section is to set the stage for later discussion by introducing the basic biology of 
three holobiont systems. The examples achieve two goals. First, the examples demonstrate that 
symbiotic interactions between microbes and macrobes are diverse, involving many kinds of 
organisms and multiple types of interactions. Second, the examples are designed to make later 
discussion vivid. Each example is representative of a particular kind of biological system that will be 
helpful for making certain theoretical points clear later in the essay. The three holobiont examples I 
discuss are the aphid-Buchnera holobiont, the squid-Vibrio holobiont, and the human-microorganism 
holobiont. 
2.1  The aphid-Buchnera holobiont 
6 
Pea aphids (Acyrthosiphon pisum) are sap-sucking insects that have a close association with a bacterial 
species called Buchnera aphidicola. Buchnera are endosymbiotic, residing inside the cytoplasm of aphid 
cells in specialized compartments called bacteriocytes. The symbiotic interaction between aphids and 
Buchnera is metabolic in nature. Aphids have a nutritionally restricted diet of plant sap. Buchnera 
bacteria provide their aphid hosts with certain necessary amino acids that supplement their diet. 
When treated with antibiotics, which kill the Buchnera bacteria, the aphids die. Buchnera cannot survive 
apart from their hosts either. Since neither partner can live without the other, this symbiosis is 
obligate for both partners. The association between aphids and Buchnera aphidicola is estimated to 
have been established about 250 million years ago. 
Buchnera symbionts are transmitted to offspring vertically, in the cytoplasm of maternal eggs. 
This inheritance mechanism ensures that all offspring aphids are inoculated with the bacteria 
necessary for their nutritionally deficient lifestyle. Aphid offspring always inherit the same bacterial 
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strain that their mother associates with. The way in which Buchnera are transmitted to aphid offspring 
is very similar to the way in which mitochondria are transmitted in some multicellular eukaryotic 
organisms. In human lineages, for example, mitochondria are inherited maternally, in the cytoplasm 
of the maternal egg that partially forms the zygote from which each human develops. This 
transmission mechanism ensures that each human offspring has mitochondria, and it ensures that 
their mitochondria will be descendants of their mother’s. The similarities between transmission of 
Buchnera bacteria and mitochondria have led to questions about precisely how to distinguish between 
vertically transmitted bacterial symbionts and organelles, like mitochondria and chloroplasts 
(Andersson 2000; Douglas and Raven 2003). 
2.2  The squid-Vibrio holobiont 
7 
The aphid-Buchnera symbiosis has a purely metabolic basis. The importance of microbes to hosts is 
not limited to metabolic enhancement, however. One example of a different kind of association is 
the one between the Hawaiian bobtail squid, Euprymna scolopes, and a species of luminescent bacteria 
called Vibrio fischeri. Vibrio bacteria colonize a particular structure in the squid, called the light organ. 
The luminescent activity of the Vibrio bacteria aids the squid in predator avoidance. Bobtail squid 
hunt at night, and are visible to predators when they occlude light from the moon and stars above. 
Vibrio bacteria luminesce in the light organ of the squid, thereby making the squid less likely to be 
spotted by predators from below. The squid expel approximately 95% of the bacteria from their 
light organ each morning into the open ocean. They then burrow into the sand at the ocean floor to 
await their next hunt. The remaining Vibrio bacteria replicate within the light organ during the day, 
and a full complement of bacteria will be present when night falls. 
Bacterial infestation of bobtail squid begins at birth, when an offspring exits the mother and 
first reaches the water column. Planktonic Vibrio bacteria can be found throughout the ocean, 
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though they are present in much greater numbers in areas where bobtail squid are abundant. There 
are finely tuned mechanisms in the light organ of the squid that separate the “good” from the “bad” 
bacteria that are encountered in the ocean water. Most squid are inoculated with Vibrio within hours 
of birth. 
The squid-Vibrio symbiosis contrasts with the aphid-Buchnera symbiosis with respect to the 
mechanism underlying the transmission of symbionts to offspring. In the squid-Vibrio system, 
transmission of Vibrio occurs horizontally, via the water column, as opposed to vertically, via (one or 
more) parents. 
Vibrio feature quite prominently in the adaptive squid life cycle. They play an important role in 
the ability of squid to safely feed themselves. Vibrio bacteria are also important for proper 
development of the light organ. When squid are raised without bacteria in laboratory conditions, the 
light organ displays a pattern of development that is different from those that are raised in contact 
with Vibrio. The parts of a squid-Vibrio holobiont are thus involved in a complex interplay involving 
development, physiology, and behavior. 
2.3  The human-microorganism holobiont 
Accumulating knowledge of microorganisms and their various biological roles in the life cycles of 
human beings has changed the way that many biologists think about the boundaries of a human 
organism. Microorganisms live in and on every healthy human being (The Human Microbiome 
Project Consortium 2012). Infestation begins at birth, and follows species-specific patterns of 
ecological succession. The preface of a recent edited volume on bacteria and their effects on the 
biology of their hosts gives a sense of just how deep the human relation with microbes is: “Humans, 
most of whom fear bacterial infection, may be the acme of bacterial cooperation as ninety percent 
of the cells in the average human are bacteria, and the number of bacterial species living happily 
with us is estimated to be between 1,000 and 3,000” (McFall-Ngai, Henderson, and Ruby 2005, xii). 31 
The microbial associates of human beings are not limited to bacteria, moreover. There are also 
representatives from the other taxonomic domains, Archaea and Eukarya. 
The microorganismal associates of human beings are not bystanders. They are important for the 
well-being of human organisms. For example, many types of microbes live in the intestine and play 
a crucial role in digestion. It has been estimated that the microbial organisms residing in the human 
intestine have an average aggregate biomass of 1.5 kilograms (Xu and Gordon 2003, 10452). 
Microorganisms are responsible for the synthesis of certain products that a human’s endogenous 
cells are not capable of synthesizing, products that make the degradation of certain plant 
polysaccharides possible. This has led to some striking claims about the nature of human-
microorganismal holobionts. For example, it has been suggested that, “the microbiota function as a 
multifunctional organ whose component cell lineages provide metabolic traits that we have not fully 
evolved in our own genome” (Xu and Gordon 2003, 10452), and that, “Collectively, the flora has a 
metabolic activity equal to a virtual organ within an organ” (O’Hara and Shanahan 2006, 688). 
Biologists are clearly hinting at the idea that microbes ought to be considered parts of human beings, 
necessary components of a physiologically integrated whole. 
The microbiota are not only important in human physiology. Microorganisms also affect 
development. Capillary networks in the guts of lab-raised germ-free mice are very primitive 
compared to mice that are raised in normal conditions. The introduction of specific bacteria results 
in the proper development of those networks. Because mice and humans are closely related, it is 
possible to infer that similar phenomena occur in humans. Developmental systems require the 
presence of microorganisms: “Certain postnatal developmental phenomena in mammals are 
manifestations and consequences of coevolved beneficial symbioses” (Xu and Gordon 2003, 
10454). From a perspective on human biology in which developmental systems are the focus, 
treating microorganisms as parts of a human being appears to be a reasonable attitude. 32 
The recognition that the microbial associates of human beings are important for both their 
physiology and development resulted in the launching of the Human Microbiome Project, designed 
explicitly to mirror the Human Genome Project. The objective is to generate knowledge of the 
various identities and roles played by lineages of microorganisms associated with human beings 
through the use of contemporary genomics technology (see, e.g., The Human Microbiome Project 
Consortium 2012). Work in genomics has fostered ideas to the effect that the human-microorganism 
collective can rightly be conceived as something akin to a multigenomic organism: “If humans are 
thought of as a composite of microbial and human cells, the human genetic landscape as an 
aggregate of the genes in the human genome and the microbiome, and human metabolic features as 
a blend of human and microbial traits, then the picture that emerges is one of a human 
‘supraorganism’” (Turnbaugh et al. 2007, 804). From a traditional biological perspective, this is not 
how we tend think of ourselves. But microbial research is changing the received view concerning the 
nature of multicellular organisms, including human beings. From the perspective of at least some 
areas in biology, like theories about immunology, physiology, and development, human beings can 
rightly be said to include, as parts, their cooperative microorganismal symbiotic partners (Pradeu 
2012). 
The examples discussed in this section are not outliers. They represent just some of the diversity 
in the kinds of interactions that multicellular creatures have with microbes, and they represent kinds 
of systems that will be useful for making certain theoretical points clear later in the essay. The 
influence of microorganisms on the biology of animals, fungi, and plants is just beginning to be 
fully understood, however. The systems canvassed here are just the tip of the iceberg of symbiotic 
holobiont diversity (see the essays in Dupré 2012c for more examples). 33 
3.  Holobionts As Units of Selection 
One result of research on holobiont collectives has been to call into question a historically 
influential idea according to which genetically homogeneous organisms are conceived as the 
fundamental units upon which natural selection operates (Santelices 1999; cf. Janzen 1977). A reason 
for thinking about organisms as genetically homogeneous is that many organisms develop from a 
single cell. In such organisms, all descendant cells might be expected to have the same genotype as 
the initial cell. It is now recognized, however, that the inevitability of mutation during mitotic cell 
division in development will with probabilistic certainty result in some genetic variation in the cells of 
an organism. This phenomenon is called mosaicism. The idea that even familiar organisms are 
genetically homogeneous is thus now seen as an idealization, as something which is strictly speaking 
false (Buss 1987; Godfrey-Smith 2009). There are also many taxa in which the usual developmental 
outcomes are functionally organized wholes that are not genetically homogeneous (Buss 1987; 
Santelices 1999; Anderson and Kohn 2007; Grosberg and Strathmann 2007; Clarke 2011b; Dupré 
and O’Malley 2012a). At least one organism concept based on immunological criteria suggests that 
symbiotic microbiota should be considered parts of organisms, not something separate from them 
(Pradeu 2010; Pradeu 2012). So the recent literature in this area reflects an emerging perspective 
according to which organisms, qua functionally integrated wholes, needn’t always or even usually be 
genetically homogeneous entities. Research on holobionts has contributed to this perspective. 
Assent to the notion that organisms needn’t be genetically homogeneous is where broad 
agreement ends, however. Recognition that holobionts are common in nature has led many 
biologists and philosophers of biology to reassess their views about various processes and associated 
concepts that are foundational in biological thinking, including evolutionary processes and concepts. 
Dupré and O’Malley are in the vanguard of this movement, suggesting that microbial biology has 
radical implications for the future development of many areas of philosophy of biology (2012b). 34 
They have defended a view of the natural world in which “collaboration” among entities of 
fundamentally different types is essential to all living systems (2012a). Collaboration encompasses 
cooperation and competition, includes metabolic, structural, and fitness-affecting interactions, and 
involves entities at many levels of biological organization. Dupré and O’Malley suggest that their 
perspective has, “radical implications for the way we think about evolution” (2012a, 225), as well as 
other biological processes, concepts, and categories. 
Such putatively transformational views about the process of evolution are not limited to 
philosophers. In a recent paper, biologists Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg articulate what they call 
the “hologenome theory of evolution,” which they see as an alternative to “currently accepted 
dogma,” according to which the units of selection are individual organisms as traditionally conceived 
(2008, 731). They write, “In the hologenome theory of evolution, we suggest that the holobiont… 
with its hologenome, acting in consortium, should be considered a unit of selection in evolution…” 
(2008, 723). Dupré and O’Malley endorse a similar view about the fundamental entities that are 
operated on by natural selection: “…complex systems involving the collaboration of many highly 
diverse lineage-forming entities” (Dupré and O’Malley 2012a, 225). Among researchers of 
symbiosis, there appears to be a growing trend toward this kind of interpretation about the units of 
selection (see, e.g., Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2013; Mandrioli and Manicardi 2013; Singh et al. 2013). 
The suggestions made by Dupré and O’Malley and Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg are similar. 
Holobionts, it is proposed, are cohesive with respect to the process of natural selection. 
Metaphorically, organisms with all their attendant microbiota are individuals from selection’s 
“perspective.” As such, collaborative symbiotic associations are at least one kind of fundamental unit 
upon which the sorting action of natural selection operates. Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg and 
Dupré and O’Malley emphasize, moreover, that as far as we know there has never been a living 
system on Earth that did not participate in collaborative interactions between entities that belong to 35 
different kinds (2008; 2012a). Evolution on this planet has thus always involved symbiotic 
associations between taxonomically and genetically divergent entities. Holobionts are therefore 
perhaps the most fundamental selectional units. It is crucial, these authors suggest, to change our 
understanding of the process of evolution by natural selection in the light of the ubiquity of 
holobionts. 
4.  Selection, Reproduction, and Lineages 
Assessing claims about units of selection, like those discussed in the previous section, requires a 
foundational understanding of the process of evolution by natural selection. Perhaps the most well 
known account of natural selection was articulated by Lewontin in a paper called “The Units of 
Selection” (1970). Lewontin’s view has been developed in the decades since his 1970 publication (see 
Godfrey-Smith 2007). Godfrey-Smith has recently defended an evolutionary framework that is 
influenced by Lewontin’s work (Godfrey-Smith 2009). His terminology is useful, and I use it 
extensively in what follows. Godfrey-Smith defines a “Darwinian population” as, “a collection of 
causally connected individual things in which there is variation in character, which leads to 
differences in reproductive output (differences is how much or how quickly individuals reproduce), 
and which is inherited to some extent” (2009, 39). This is effectively an account of the minimal 
requirements for an evolving population. Populations of entities that exhibit the described 
characteristics will (ceteris paribus) evolve by natural selection. The entities that make up Darwinian 
populations are called “Darwinian individuals” (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 40). Darwinian populations 
and the individuals that make them up can be found at multiple levels of the biological hierarchy, 
and may include genes, organelles, cells, organisms, and sometimes groups of organisms. Godfrey-
Smith’s account provides an entry point for thinking about the process of natural selection more 
generally.  36 
Lewontin’s intellectual descendants recognize that talk of “units of selection” remains quite 
natural. Darwinian individuals are units of selection under another name; they are the entities whose 
differential survival and reproduction result in the evolution of the populations that they make up, 
and as such are the loci of causal action for the process of selection. Lewontin’s approach thus 
provides a coherent starting point for thinking about the units of selection problem, and is one of 
the main avenues upon which researchers continue to tread in the traditional debate (Lewontin 1970; 
Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
Darwinian individuals are essentially reproducing things. Inheritance concerns the causal 
production of offspring by a parent or parents, while fitness is often measured in terms of the 
number of offspring that parent individuals produce. Hence, the very application of the concepts of 
inheritance and fitness to biological systems requires that parents give rise to clearly distinguishable 
offspring, i.e., that they reproduce. Godfrey-Smith distinguishes between paradigm reproducers, and 
marginal ones. Paradigm cases of collective reproduction require that reproducing entities have high 
“scores” on three variable criteria: a bottleneck of some type between generations, a distinction 
between germ and soma tissue, and functional integration of parts (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 5.2). When 
at least one of these criteria is absent, the entity can be said to be a marginal reproducer. There is 
difficulty determining lineage-based relationships in such cases. 
By contrast, paradigm reproducers are conceived as being parts of determinate lineages in the 
Darwinian populations framework. One traditional way of conceptualizing lineages is as segments 
of a “tree of life,” understood as a representation of the overall pattern of ancestry and descent 
among all living entities past and present. In the context of this essay, a good way to think about the 
shape of such a representation is to begin by considering individual organisms and their 
reproductive relations, and then to investigate what large scale patterns arise as reproductive events 
accumulate over time. This approach has its roots in the phylogenetic work of Hennig (1999), and 37 
has recently been endorsed and expanded by Godfrey-Smith (2014). Traditionally, neo-Darwinists 
have suggested that lineages of reproducing entities ought to be represented as branching through 
time, but never merging, thus resembling the shape of a tree (Dupré 2012a). As Godfrey-Smith 
points out, however, reproductive relations between individuals are quite diverse: “we find different 
organism-level relationships when we are zoomed in, and these have consequences for what shape 
can be claimed to exist when we zoom out” (2014, 117). Indeed, once the empirical details are taken 
on board, it can be seen that different parts of the entire representation of ancestry and descent 
have a distinctive topology, and some are not tree-like at all (some cases will be discussed in more 
detail below). Nevertheless, on the Darwinian populations view there are more or less determinate 
reproductive events that ground an accurate representation of the total “shape” of life. Lineages, 
segments of that representation, are chains of reproducers. 
As we’ve seen, it has been argued that Earthly organisms are and always have been collaborative, 
metabolically integrated wholes, consisting of parts that hail from, and are embedded in, various 
lineages (Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008; Dupré and O’Malley 2012a; 2012b). Let us grant 
that many or all living systems are like this. This does not immediately preclude the possibility that 
collaborative wholes are themselves reproducing entities. The endogenous cells (zygotic 
descendants) of a human being, for example, reproduce over the course of an individual’s lifetime. 
Mitotic cell division is a necessary part of human developmental processes. But cellular 
reproduction does not preclude reproductive processes at the multicellular level: humans reproduce 
even though they’re composed of reproducing cells. Similarly, eukaryotic cells consist of parts that 
were once free-living bacteria. Mitochondria are derived from bacteria that over evolutionary time 
became intimately associated with their hosts, and are now uncontroversially conceived as parts of 
eukaryotic cells and individuals comprised of such cells. Reproducers may contain reproducers as 38 
parts, and in at least some cases there is no problem discerning higher-level lineages (Mindell 1992; 
Godfrey-Smith 2012). 
Some symbiotic associations are like this. Vertically transmitted endosymbionts provide the 
clearest example. The aphid-Buchnera mutualism fits the bill of a collaborative metabolically 
integrated entity consisting of parts from different lineages. Intergenerational reproduction of the 
bacterial symbionts is regulated in specific ways by the whole. Buchnera bacteria are transmitted to 
offspring vertically, in the cytoplasm of the maternal egg. The method of transmission of the 
symbionts from parent to offspring is strikingly similar to the transmission of mitochondria in 
eukaryotes. As I previously pointed out, this has led to questions about whether Buchnera is better 
seen as a bacterium or as an organelle (Andersson 2000; Douglas and Raven 2003). Either way, there 
are no problems discerning aphid-Buchnera holobiont lineages. Aphid-Buchnera holobionts are 
reproducers, and as such are relatively uncontroversial candidates for units of selection (Godfrey-
Smith 2012; Mandrioli and Manicardi 2013). 
Holobiont reproductive relations become murkier in cases in which symbionts are not 
transmitted vertically, but are picked up horizontally from the environment. Gut microorganisms 
and Vibrio bacteria are acquired horizontally by humans and squid respectively. I assume in what 
follows that human-microorganism holobionts and squid-Vibrio holobionts are representatives of 
functionally organized organismal entities, aggregately composed of parts from different kingdoms. 
What then can be said about the reproductive capacities of such entities? An idealized proposal for 
understanding relations of ancestry and descent between holobionts can be put as follows. Pick a 
holobiont from the offspring generation. The entities in the previous generation that are causally 
responsible for the production of the offspring’s reproducing biotic parts are its parents. 
Consider squid-Vibrio holobionts in the light of this proposal. A single squid is minimally 
colonized by six distinct planktonic Vibrio bacteria that come from the aquatic environment in which 39 
the squid is born; the usual number is between six and twelve (Wollenberg and Ruby 2009). This 
means that any functional squid-Vibrio holobiont will, minimally, have eight parent entities: six 
distinct strains of bacteria, and two squid, which sexually reproduce. There are no evolved 
inheritance mechanisms that ensure that each holobiont in a population has this minimal number of 
parents, however. Inevitably, individuals in a population of squid-Vibrio holobionts will have 
different numbers of parent entities. One holobiont might have fourteen parents, another eleven, 
and still another might have eight, etc. 
Relations of ancestry and descent among human-microorganism holobionts are perhaps even 
murkier. Each holobiont has two human parents, and is colonized by billions of bacterial and other 
microorganisms that belong to many different species (The Human Microbiome Project 
Consortium 2012). Suppose that there are 1000 distinct species of microorganisms associated with a 
human host at some time (an idealization). Assuming that each species-specific microorganismal 
population represented in a human-microorganism holobiont is descended from a single initial 
individual (another idealization) it would follow that each human-microorganism holobiont has 
1,000 microorganismal parents and two human parents. Without these idealizations in place what 
becomes clear is that a human holobiont at any given time has a massive number of parent entities. 
Much like squid-Vibrio holobionts, it is inevitable that individual holobionts in populations of this 
type will have radically different numbers of parents, one from another. 
That holobionts of a kind in a population have different numbers of parents is an indicator that 
those holobionts are parts of marginally determinate lineages. When lineages are unclear it is not 
obvious how to understand the fitness of the parental entities in such populations. A helpful 
contrast is an idealized sexually reproducing population, in which each offspring entity has two, and 
only two, parents. Parental pairs might be seen as natural units. In a sexually reproducing population, 
each member of a parental pair contributes half of their genetic material to the creation of a new 40 
individual. Every offspring individual in the population is produced by one of these pairs. Now 
consider whether or not squid-Vibrio holobionts have similar natural parental units. The parent 
entity of a particular squid-Vibrio holobiont consists of two squid and six or more planktonic 
bacteria floating about in the ocean. Each holobiont is aggregately constructed by a variable number 
and arrangement of biotic parts; there is no repeatable metric for calculating the fitness of such a 
collection. 
Squid, however, are parts of clear sexual lineages, and Vibrio of asexual ones. It is the squid-
Vibrio collectives that belong to marginal lineages. The biological facts on the ground ensure that 
relations of ancestry and descent between squid-Vibrio holobionts are indeterminate. Given the 
diversity and numbers of microorganisms involved, relations of ancestry and descent between 
human-microorganism holobionts are perhaps even more indeterminate than they are between 
squid-Vibrio holobionts. 
These kinds of considerations have led Godfrey-Smith to claim that aggregatively developing 
holobionts, composed partly of horizontally transmitted symbionts, should not be understood as 
Darwinian individuals, and hence should not be understood as units of selection (2012). Here we 
can note a disagreement: Dupré and O’Malley agree with Godfrey-Smith that metabolic units 
composed of multiple interacting reproductive lineages are common in nature, but they nevertheless 
insist that such polygenomic consortia are the fundamental units of selection (Dupré and O’Malley 
2012b; 2012a). 
A possible reply to the claim that squid-Vibrio holobionts do not belong to determinate lineages 
would be to suggest that such holobionts are simply not parts of familiar patterns of ancestry and 
descent. Biologists and philosophers are used to thinking about reproductive relations in the context 
of sexually or asexually reproducing organisms. Somebody might suggest that that is all it means for 
such lineages of organisms to be called “determinate.” The facts about holobiont ancestry and 41 
descent, that squid-Vibrio holobionts have multiple parents composed of parts that are not 
necessarily physiologically integrated and that each holobiont in a population tends to have radically 
different numbers of parents, are merely unfamiliar to many who have considered these issues. 
It is important to note that making real world determinations of just which individuals are the 
parents of certain kinds of holobionts (e.g., a human-microorganism holobiont at a time) would be 
epistemologically difficult, due to the necessity of tracking constituent lineages in fine-grained detail. 
Nevertheless, it will inevitably be a biological fact of the matter that each symbiotic collective is 
composed of reproducing biotic parts (genes, organelles, cells, etc.) that make up Darwinian 
populations and are embedded in determinate reproductive lineages. So, with perfect information, 
true relations of parenthood could be determined for any given collective holobiont at any given 
time. The epistemological problems associated with tracking lineages of parts of holobionts should 
not lead to confusion about the fact that such patterns could be determined in principle. So in some 
sense there are relations of ancestry and descent between holobionts, even if they stretch the 
familiar concept of parenthood. Representations of ancestry and descent among symbiotic 
holobionts may be highly complex and reticulated, engaging in patterns that have yet to be fully 
understood. That should not necessarily bar such entities from being treated as proper evolutionary 
units in their own right. 
Indeed, reticulated networks of ancestry and descent are known in certain kinds of organisms. 
Among prokaryotic life forms, for example, lateral gene transfer (LGT) is very common. LGT 
involves the transfer of genetic material between even evolutionarily distant prokaryotic cells, and 
occurs via several known mechanisms (Doolittle and Bapteste 2007; Dupré and O’Malley 2012b). 
LGT is ubiquitous and plays an important role in the development, maintenance, and adaptiveness 
of the ubiquitous multicellular multispecies bacterial communities called biofilms (Dupré and 
O’Malley 2012b; Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2013). Observation and analysis of LGT have led some to 42 
argue that the notion of a tree-shaped representation of ancestry and descent for all life forms is not 
accurate (Doolittle and Bapteste 2007; Doolittle 2009). Despite an abundance of LGT, however, 
bacteria are still uncontroversially accepted as evolutionary units (as individual cells and, more 
controversially, as multicellular communities) (Dupré and O’Malley 2012b). 
In general, there is agreement among contemporary philosophers of biology that it is an open 
empirical question whether a branching tree structure is an accurate representation of the 
reproductive relations between entities at any given level of the biological hierarchy. Some are 
vociferous in the potential for revisionism (Dupré 2012a), while others are more circumspect: “In 
the future the “tree of life” may be seen as a rough representation that has been superseded by 
something else, which might be just more diverse in shape or might have other theoretically 
important structure” (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 118). 
This open-minded attitude toward revisionism or pluralism about representations of ancestry 
and descent among organisms may initially hearten those interested in taking holobiont reproductive 
relations seriously. One potential way forward might be to use what is known about prokaryotic 
evolutionary patterns and processes as a model for working out the distinctive patterns of holobiont 
evolution. After all, holobiont reproductive relationships are similar in some ways to the 
relationships between individual prokaryotic cells. Each bacterial cell has a number of different 
genetic “parents,” and its genome comes to have the properties it does in virtue of a kind of 
aggregation of parts via LGT. Moreover, there are trackable, determinate lineages among the 
individual genes that make up the genome of each bacterial cell. A holobiont is similar: it comes to 
have the polygenomic attributes it has via aggregative development of various microbes and 
macrobes, and there are determinate lineages among the cellular parts of a holobiont (the analog of 
gene lineages in prokaryotes). 43 
These initial similarities between evolutionary patterns in bacteria and holobionts have their 
limits, however, and at least one difference arguably has important evolutionary consequences. The 
difference is that there are determinate cell-level lineages in prokaryotes that exhibit a branching, 
tree-like structure (Doolittle 2009)
8, while there are not in most holobionts. Holobionts, that is, 
exhibit determinate lineages among their parts (the analog of gene lineages in prokaryotes), but no 
determinate lineages among the collectives (no analog of cell lineages in prokaryotes) (Godfrey-
Smith 2012; Dupré and O’Malley 2012a). This explains why a Darwinian populationist would be 
inclined to treat most holobionts as marginal Darwinian units, but would include bacteria as 
Darwinian individuals. Bacteria are spatially bounded reproducers, though they are also products of 
reticulated networks of genes; most holobionts are neither bounded nor are they reproducers. 
At this point in the dialectic the situation looks like this: due to what is known about the 
aggregate development of holobionts, one party tends toward the view that such entities are not 
reproducers and hence not cohesive with respect to the process of natural selection (i.e., not 
selectable units). The related concepts of parenthood and reproduction have simply been stretched 
too far, and most holobionts are marginal reproducers at best (Godfrey-Smith 2009; 2011b; 2012). 
Another party observes the ubiquity of collaborative polygenomic metabolic entities and accepts 
that they are evolutionary units, despite their being incapable of independent reproduction. A 
concomitant of this perspective is a kind of revisionism: about the idea that reproduction and 
lineage formation are required of evolutionary units, about the notion that evolutionary units have 
clear boundaries, and about the overall evolutionary patterns that emerge from the ubiquitous 
merging of distinct lineages (Dupré 2012c). 
                                                 
8 In pointing out the fact that branching cell-level lineages are inevitable I’m not taking sides in the debate about whether 
the “tree of cells” has some special importance for understanding prokaryotic evolution (see Lerat et al. 2005; Doolittle 
and Bapteste 2007; Doolittle 2009; Dupré 2012a). 44 
5.  Interactors and the Possibility of Pluralism 
The Darwinian populations framework is one in which the concept of a Darwinian individual is 
derived from what is often taken to be the best foundational account of the process of evolution by 
natural selection. The assertion that many holobionts are not Darwinian individuals is thus 
embedded in a rich Darwinain theoretical apparatus, designed to do much more than identify units 
of selection (Godfrey-Smith 2009). This puts the concept of a Darwinian individual on strong 
conceptual ground. Revisionist Darwinians face a challenge at this point. There must be some 
theoretically grounded reason for treating holobionts as evolutionary (if not Darwinian) individuals, 
one that is connected in some way to an evolutionary framework. 
There is an alternative account of natural selection that has been tapped to play this role: the 
replicator/interactor account. The replicator/interactor account of natural selection has its roots in 
the work of Dawkins (1976), and was modified significantly by Hull (1980; Hull, Langman, and 
Glenn 2001). The framework characterizes selection in terms of two functional roles. Replicators 
(abstracted from the role of genes) are entities which make high-fidelity copies of themselves and 
collectively build and maintain interactors (abstracted from the traditional role of organisms), 
entities that interact directly with the environment. Interactors are selected by the environment, 
resulting in the differential success of the replicator lineages that ride inside them. The 
replicator/interactor account of natural selection has had a significant impact on the units of 
selection debate in philosophy of biology. Units of selection are often theoretically identified with 
interactors (Lloyd 2012). 
The replicator/interactor framework has been applied to holobiont cases in a way that is 
modified from its original usage, and is subtly different in different contexts. Ereshefsky and 
Pedroso argue that biofilms, symbiotic bacterial consortia, are functionally organized evolutionary 
units that aren’t Darwinian individuals; instead they’re interactors (2013; cf. Dupré and O’Malley 45 
2012b). Others have applied the interactor concept to systems such as holobionts composed of 
microbes and macrobes (Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008; Dupré and O’Malley 2012a)
9, and 
even looser symbioses between macrobes (like that between ants and acacia trees) (Sterelny 2011). 
Growing recognition of the ubiquity of functionally organized multi-lineage collaborative 
holobionts might be seen as motivating an updated use of the replicator/interactor framework, one 
that is able to capture a broader category of putatively evolutionarily relevant individuals than the 
reproducer concept and the Darwinian populations framework. 
The interactor concept was originally envisioned as an abstraction of the selective role of 
genetically homogeneous, reproducing organisms. What is being suggested by each of the authors 
cited above, however, is that interactors are typically far from bounded, genetically homogeneous 
organisms with tightly associated parts, unitary development, and independent reproductive 
capacities. All that is needed for an entity to be an interactor is for it to exhibit a functional 
integration sufficient to have a unitary influence on the independent reproduction of its parts (cf. 
Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2013). Dupré emphasizes the role of shared fate among interacting 
microbes (Dupré 2012a, 153). Notably, both Zilber-Rosenberg and Dupré and O’Malley link their 
discussions of interactors to the group selectionist views of Sober and Wilson (1999; see Zilber-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008, 731; Dupré and O’Malley 2012a, 225), suggesting that group 
selection is a good starting point for understanding the evolution of multispecies communities. 
There are two issues that can be seen to be problematic for the replicator/interactor perspective 
on the evolution of holobionts. First, the interactor perspective on holobionts, as currently 
endorsed, suffers from imprecision. More needs to be said about just what kinds of causal 
interactions among parts serve to bind independently reproducing populations into interactors. 
                                                 
9 Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg suggest that holobionts play the role of the interactor as well as the role of the 
replicator in evolution (Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008, 731). Replicators are typically taken to be entities that 
make high-fidelity copies of themselves (Dawkins 1976); it is hard to see how to make a case that holobionts fit the bill. 46 
Dupré and O’Malley mention many different kinds of causal connections which they take to be 
significant, including fitness-affecting interactions, structural connections, metabolic interactions, 
functional integration, and collaboration (Dupré and O’Malley 2012a). This is a motley assortment; 
my suggestion is that there remain significant details to be worked out about just how and why 
independent lineages become linked together into evolutionary individuals. If Dupré and O’Malley 
are serious about echoing the views of Sober and Wilson (1999), for example, then they must be 
committed to the view that even ephemeral fitness-affecting interactions bind individuals into 
groups. However, one wonders how comfortable they would be with the notion that there is 
fundamentally no difference between something like a functionally integrated holobiont and an 
ephemerally interacting group of independently reproducing individuals. But what, exactly, is the 
difference? In precisely what way does their view, “go beyond contemporary concepts of group 
selection in multi-level selectionism” (Dupré and O’Malley 2012a, 225)? 
The second problem facing interactor accounts of holobiont evolution is that it is arguable that 
the Darwinian populations framework can ultimately account adequately for the origin of symbiotic 
systems, which raises the question of what unique theoretical role the claim that holobionts are units 
of selection is supposed to be playing. Godfrey-Smith, for example, has argued that it is possible to 
give coevolutionary explanations of symbiotic collectives in which traits of individuals comprising 
two (or more) interacting Darwinian populations can be characterized such that they explain the 
origin of complex wholes (which are not themselves Darwinian individuals). In these kinds of 
explanations, “each population operates as part of the environment for the other” (2011b, 508). 
Coevolutionary explanations of symbiotic collectives are common among those who focus on the 
evolution of symbiosis (for a coevolutionary approach to human-microbe holobionts see 
Dethlefsen, McFall-Ngai, and Relman 2007; for a general coevolutionary approach see Douglas 
2010). If coevolutionary explanations can reliably explain the origin of holobionts, then it is not 47 
clear what the explanatory or conceptual payoff of treating multispecies holobionts as interactors 
and as units of selection is supposed to be. 
Moreover, coevolutionary explanations accord with a more or less traditional neo-Darwinian 
view about evolutionary patterns and processes. By contrast, a view in which holobionts are seen as 
units of selection is one in which reproductive relationships between such entities have to be 
reconceptualized, and in which Darwinian processes must be seen in a radically revisionist light 
(Dupré 2012a). I leave it to the reader to determine whether or not such revisionism is warranted. 
Neither of the problems with the replicator/interactor framework constitutes a conclusive 
reason to completely abandon it as a potential representation of the evolutionary processes affecting 
holobionts, however. A reasonable attitude at this point would be to keep an open mind as to which 
foundational framework can best represent the evolution of complex multispecies communities in 
different explanatory contexts. Indeed, in a certain light, there are significant areas of overlap. Dupré 
argues for a kind of pluralism about biological individuality: “…the organisms that are parts of 
evolutionary lineages are not the same things as the organisms that interact functionally with their 
biological and non-biological surroundings. The latter, which I take to be more fundamental, are 
composed of a variety of the former, which are the more traditionally conceived organisms” (Dupré 
2012b, 124–125). Godfrey-Smith makes no claims about fundamentality, but does endorse a similar 
kind of pluralism, arguing that there are two caterogories of biological individual: organisms 
(metabolic units) and Darwinain individuals (reproducers) (2012)
10. Some entities belong in both 
categories, but many do not. So there is agreement between the two sides that there are multiple 
similar options for understanding biologically relevant individuals and processes; there may even be 
broad agreement about the actual boundaries of natural biological individuals. In an evolved world, 
                                                 
10 It is worth noting the terminological nuances here: Dupré understands the lineage-based category to pick out, “the 
more traditionally conceived organisms,” whereas Godfrey-Smith understands traditional organismality in terms 
metabolism, regardless of a metabolizer’s capacity to form lineages. 48 
moreover, there will inevitably be a range of paradigm and more marginal cases of both kinds of 
entities. Perhaps such pluralism in nature should vindicate conceptual pluralism among naturalists. 
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ESSAY THREE: POPULATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN HETEROKARYOTIC FUNGI: 
A MULTILEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
1.  Introduction 
Among mycologists, questions persist about what entities should be treated as the fundamental units 
of fungal populations (Burnett 2003). Certain features of fungi, such as being very small and often 
developing underground, ensure that there will always be practical difficulties associated with 
studying populations of these organisms (Anderson and Kohn 1998). Questions about how to 
properly understand fungal population dynamics are often taken to involve something more than 
merely practical considerations, however. The fungi that have proved most difficult to understand 
are heterokaryotic fungi, including the familiar mushroom producing fungi in the group 
Basidiomycota. Decades of research on these organisms have unlocked many secrets about their 
biological organization, yet consensus about the proper analysis of heterokaryotic fungal 
populations and individuals has remained elusive. One reason for the lack of consensus is 
undoubtedly continuing discussion surrounding the units of selection debate (see Okasha 2006). 
Heterokaryotic fungi, however, exhibit characteristics that would make them difficult to categorize 
even in the absence of any overarching dispute about evolutionary theory. 
The aim of this essay is to articulate a coherent view about populations of heterokaryotic 
basidiomycete fungi and the individuals that comprise them. The framework I employ is a version of 
the one developed by Godfrey-Smith in Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection (2009). The essay is 
organized as follows. First, I discuss the role of individuality in evolutionary theoretical contexts 
generally. This discussion includes an articulation of some concepts that will be become central later 
on: the minimal concept of a Darwinian population and the derivative concept of a Darwinian individual. 
Next, I argue that entities at (at least) two levels of the biological hierarchy satisfy the minimal 50 
concept in heterokaryotic fungi: mycelia and submycelial elements (particularly nuclei). That entities 
at two different levels of the hierarchy constitute evolvable populations invites a question about how 
to understand the relation between these two populations. In the final section of the essay, I provide 
a preliminary sketch of an answer, which involves moving beyond the minimal concept of a 
Darwinian population to investigate in more detail the properties of populations of submycelial 
elements. I employ a comparative perspective. The phenomenon of intraorganismal genetic 
heterogeneity (IGH) plays a substantial role in the final section. The existence of heterokaryotic 
fungi demonstrates that organisms can be composed of entities that are quite divergent genetically. 
This idea runs contrary to a common view, according to which genetically distinct entities do not 
engage in cooperative behavior with one another and tend to degrade the integrity of whatever entity 
they are parts of. Heterokaryotic fungi show that organisms needn’t always be composed of 
genetically identical (or similar) parts and that the evolution of such organisms is not rare or unusual. 
Philosophers of biology have not paid a great deal of attention to fungal biology. Fungi, 
however, are a diverse and ecologically important group of organisms inhabiting this planet, and will 
inevitably play a role in a full and accurate understanding of living things. Another goal of this essay 
is therefore to make philosophers aware of the biology of the fungi with the intention of 
contributing to the reorientation of general discussions about the nature of biological individuality, 
organismality, and evolutionary transitions (much as Clarke has done through an analysis of plant 
evolution and individuality; see Clarke 2011b; Clarke 2012). 
2.  Evolution and Individuality/Darwinian Individuals 
Evolutionary explanations of a certain type always employ a criterion of biological individuality, 
most often tacitly. In particular, population biologists must not only be able to distinguish individuals 
in a population from their neighbors synchronically; fitness calculations also require the ability to 51 
distinguish parents from their offspring diachronically. So counting individuals is essential to doing the 
kind of demographic work required for evolutionary explanation of trait distributions in 
populations (Clarke 2011a; Godfrey-Smith 2009). Thus, there is a certain category of biological 
individual, which I call the evolutionary individual, that necessarily arises in the context of 
evolutionary explanation. Any particular account of evolutionary individuality will be linked to a 
particular account of the process of natural selection. 
The best account of selection is found in the work of Darwin himself (1859/1966).
11 Darwin’s 
recipe for evolutionary change was later modified by others (especially Lewontin 1970). In recent 
years, this classical approach has been revisited by Godfrey-Smith. In Darwinian Populations and 
Natural selection Godfrey-Smith articulates what he refers to as the “minimal concept” of a 
Darwinian population: “A Darwinian population in the minimal sense is a collection of causally connected 
individual things in which there is variation in character, which leads to differences in reproductive 
output (differences in how much or how quickly individuals reproduce), and which is inherited to 
some extent. Inheritance is understood as similarity between parent and offspring, due to the causal 
role of the parents” (2009, 39; italics in original). Godfrey-Smith argues that the minimal concept is 
central to understanding Darwinian phenomena. Populations that satisfy the minimal concept have 
the potential to evolve by natural selection. In investigating whether or not a particular system has 
the capacity to evolve by natural selection, one starting point is to assess the system in light of the 
minimal concept. Godfrey-Smith suggests that an initially inclusive and permissive attitude about 
which populations satisfy the minimal concept is appropriate. Further, more fine-grained 
                                                 
11 An alternative to understanding selection is the replicator approach, articulated by Dawkins (1976/2006) and amended 
by Hull (1980; Hull, Langman, and Glenn 2001). The central idea behind replicator views is that each episode of natural 
selection requires two functional roles to be filled: those of the replicator and the interactor. According to Hull, 
replicators and interactors are both individual entities essential to the process of natural selection (1980; 1992). 
Replicator views thus provide an account of evolutionary individuality. There is active debate between adherents of the 
two foundational accounts (Sterelny 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2011b; Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2013). No consensus has 
emerged. The primary difference concerns the treatment of certain symbiotic systems. Symbiosis is not my topic, so I 
limit my discussion of evolutionary individuality to Darwinian populations and individuals. With suitable modifications, 
my claims could be understood within the replicator framework (though that is not my preferred framework). 52 
characteristics of evolving populations are important in understanding evolutionary processes. But 
if a population satisfies the minimal concept, that is enough to warrant consideration of that 
population from a Darwinian perspective. 
As Godfrey-Smith notes, the minimal concept is merely a starting point for understanding the 
process of natural selection. A category of paradigm Darwinian populations can be distinguished 
from more minimal ones. Paradigm Darwinian populations are ones in which “significant novelty 
can emerge” and that result in “complex and adapted structures” (2009, 41). The distinction can be 
made clearer by noting that Darwinian populations can vary with respect to several parameters. The 
two most important in the context of this essay are the abundance of variation (Godfrey-Smith’s V 
parameter) and competitive interaction with respect to reproduction (Godfrey-Smith’s  parameter) 
(2009, 63). The degree to which these parameters are instantiated in a population impacts whether 
the population in question is capable of undergoing the kind of adaptive evolution that occurs 
within paradigm Darwinian populations. I say more about how these two parameters are relevant to 
heterokaryotic fungal populations in the final section of this essay. The distinction between 
paradigm and minimal Darwinian populations, and the characterization of certain variable features 
of Darwinian populations such as V and , go beyond the recipe for natural selection in Lewontin’s 
1970 discussion. 
Once the concept of a Darwinian population has been developed, a derivative concept of a 
Darwinian individual can be articulated. A Darwinian individual is, “any member of a Darwinian 
population” (2009, 40). The way the term “individual” is being employed here is different from 
other biological usages (cf. Santelices 1999; Clarke 2011a). Darwinian individuals are essentially 
reproducing things. Understanding the fitness and inheritance of individuals requires the ability to 
assess whether or not one individual is a parent of another. An important feature of Darwinian 
individuals is that they can be entities at any level of the biological hierarchy at which Darwinian 53 
populations are found. According to Godfrey-Smith, Darwinian individuals include but are not 
limited to individual viruses, genes, organelles, cells, multicellular organisms, and sometimes groups 
of multicellular organisms (2009). Correspondingly, there can be evolving populations at each of 
these levels. Importantly, the minimal concept does not rule out the possibility that there can be 
biological systems in which more than one Darwinian population can be located. Such coextensive 
Darwinian populations may have various relations to one another. 
The category of the reproducer is an important one in Godfrey-Smith’s framework. Reproducers 
are Darwinian individuals, biological entities that stand in parent-offspring relationships. As noted, 
there are various kinds of entities that can stand in such relationships. Godfrey-Smith develops a 
scheme for categorizing reproducers. The two most important kinds of reproducers in 
heterokaryotic fungi are scaffolded and collective reproducers. Scaffolded reproducers are, “entities 
which get reproduced as part of the reproduction of some larger unit… Their reproduction is 
dependent on an elaborate scaffolding of some kind that is external to them” (2009, 88). Genes are 
paradigmatic scaffolded reproducers. Collective reproducers are, “reproducing entities with parts 
that themselves have the capacity to reproduce, where the parts do so largely through their own 
resources rather than through the coordinated activity of the whole” (2009, 87). Multicellular 
organisms are paradigmatic collective reproducers. Collective reproducers are distinguished by the 
presence of three (variable) parameters: bottlenecks, germ lines, and integration. High “values” of 
these parameters, “are associated with clearer or more definite cases of reproduction, as opposed to 
more marginal ones” (2009, 94). Single-celled bottlenecks between generations, specialized germ 
tissue that is sequestered early in development, and a high degree of integration among an entity’s 
parts are indicative that the entity in question is a collective reproducer, so part of a Darwinian 
population. I will say more about the role of reproduction in characterizing fungal populations and 
individuals in the next section. 54 
It is worth noting that Godfrey-Smith does not discuss fungal populations in any significant 
detail in Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. One question about the Darwinian populations 
framework is whether or not it can make sense of the population structure of types of organisms 
with which it has never come into contact. Part of the message of this essay is that putting the 
biological details of fungi into the Darwinian populations machine and turning the crank provides a 
coherent and hitherto unarticulated view about fungal populations and individuals. 
3.  Heterokaryotic Fungi and Darwinian Populations 
In this section, I argue that the particular combination of biological characteristics exhibited by 
heterokaryotic basidiomycete fungi make it prima facie difficult to identify and classify individuals 
and populations. I suggest that three fungal structures are potential candidates for being members 
of populations that satisfy the minimal concept of a Darwinian population: genets, mycelia, and 
submycelial elements such as nuclei. I argue that fungal genets should not be treated as Darwinian 
individuals, but that contiguous mycelia should. I also argue that submycelial elements, certainly 
nuclei and perhaps mitochondria, should be treated as Darwinian individuals. 
3.1  Fungal Biology and the Issue of  Individuality 
Fungi exhibit several distinctive biological features that make it difficult to identify individuals and 
populations. Unlike many familiar metazoan organisms, a fungus has no determinate, species-typical 
body plan that develops from a single-celled spore. Fungi make their living by colonizing and 
consuming ephemeral substrates, and indeterminate growth is one solution to this adaptive problem 
(Webster and Weber 2007). Fungal growth is sometimes achieved by specialized filamentous 
structures called hyphae. In filamentous basidiomycete fungi, hyphae are often divided into sections 
by structures called septa. Septa allow cytoplasm to flow freely through hyphae, but keep nuclei 
contained in cell-like compartments. A typical, but not universal, feature of fungi is the development 55 
of a network of hyphae, called a mycelium. Mycelia are important fungal structures, often found 
underground, through which cytoplasm flows freely. This feature of fungal organization has led 
some mycologists to view a mycelium as an entity akin to a giant multinucleate cell. 
Some mycologists have pointed out that fungi are modular, as opposed to unitary, organisms. 
Various fungal structures can be considered repeatable modules, including nuclei, septate sections of 
hyphae, hyphae themselves, and even contiguous mycelia. The repeatable nature of hyphal structures 
in particular, and their ability to flexibly anastomose (fuse) with other hyphae is part of what 
bestows upon fungi their capacity for indeterminate growth. 
Any part of a fungal mycelium can be physiologically detached from the whole and, if exposed 
to a suitable substrate, can persist and eventually produce reproductive structures. Hence, there is 
not a distinction between germ tissue and soma tissue in fungi. Prior to the production of 
reproductive structures, there is no part of a fungus that is dedicated exclusively to reproduction. 
This aspect of fungi contrasts with many familiar metazoan organisms, which tend to sequester a 
germ line relatively early in their ontogeny (Buss 1987). Fungi are certainly not unique in this regard. 
It has been argued that plants also lack a distinction between germ tissue and soma tissue, which 
leads, in part, to potential confusion about their population structure (Clarke 2011b; Clarke 2012). 
Moreover, part of the message of Buss’s 1987 book The Evolution of  Individuality is that there is 
tremendous variation in how early different organisms sequester their germ cells in development. 
The modular parts of entities that do not sequester their germ tissue early in development tend to 
have more autonomy and tend to behave more like Darwinian individuals in their own right (cf. 
Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
Both sexual and asexual reproduction commonly occur in basidiomycete fungi. In asexual 
reproduction, spores that contain mitotically derived nuclei are formed and dispersed via specialized 
reproductive structures. The mycelia that develop from these asexual spores are genetically identical 56 
to their parent, though they aren’t physiologically contiguous with their parent. When two genetically 
identical mycelia come into contact with one another, the mycelia can fuse to become physiologically 
integrated and contiguous (Webster and Weber 2007, 510). 
The heterokaryotic condition is common in some fungal groups, in particular the phyla 
Ascomycota, Basidiomycota, and Glomeromycota. Heterokaryosis occurs when a single fungus, at 
some point during its life cycle, has genetically distinct nuclei ensconced in a common cytoplasm. 
Though there is tremendous variation in the detailed life cycles of heterokaryotic fungi, the idealized 
life cycle of organisms classified in the phylum Basidiomycota is well understood. This group, the 
focus of this essay, includes the familiar mushroom producing fungi. The life cycle can be described 
as follows. A basidiocarp (more commonly known as a mushroom or toadstool) produces spores, 
called basidiospores, via the process of meiosis. A single basidiospore that lands on a suitable 
substrate develops to produce a haploid monokaryotic mycelium, called the primary mycelium. The 
primary mycelium is septate, composed of many individual cell-like compartments through which 
cytoplasm can freely flow. There is one nucleus in each septate cell that is mitotically derived from 
the progenitor haploid nucleus. The nuclei cannot migrate freely throughout the mycelium. Two 
primary mycelia fuse if they have the right combination of mating type alleles. Fusion results in 
plasmogamy, the joining of cytoplasm, between the two primary mycelia, which unite to form a 
secondary mycelium. The secondary mycelium is septate, but each cell contains two distinct haploid 
nuclei, each mitotically derived from the progenitor nuclei in the primary mycelial parents. An 
organism organized in this way is called a dikaryon because it has two distinct haploid nuclei that 
coexist without fusing in each cell in the mycelium; if the nuclei are genetically different from one 
another, as they often are in basidiomycete fungi, then the organism is called a heterokaryon. A 
basidiomycete fungus can exist in the dikaryotic stage for long periods of time, and can sometimes 
form and disperse asexual dikaryotic spores. Eventually, sexual reproductive structures are formed, 57 
called basidiocarps (mushrooms). Once a basidiocarp has formed, the two haploid nuclei fuse (a 
process called karyogamy) and undergo meiosis, resulting in the production and ultimate dispersal 
of basidiospores. Some basidiospores will develop into primary mycelia, completing the life cycle 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of a typical Basidiomycete life cycle. 
 
The biological characteristics of heterokaryotic fungi make the task of identifying fungal individuals 
different from more familiar cases. One way of understanding this is by thinking comparatively. 
Consider a human being. It is relatively unproblematic to determine where one individual human 
being ends and another begins. Each human being begins life as a single-celled zygote. Each zygote 
is genetically unique (except in the case of monozygotic twins). It develops in a familiar, species-
specific way. Germ cells are sequestered early in a human being’s ontogeny, ensuring reproductive 
division of labor between germ and soma tissues. A human being consists of heterogeneous tissues 58 
and structures, integrated into a functional whole. Sexual reproduction results in the production of a 
genetically unique zygote. This suite of biological characteristics makes it unproblematic to 
discriminate human beings one from another both synchronically and diachronically. Humans can be 
easily told apart from their neighbors and their offspring. 
In fungi, some of these biological characteristics are either missing or are less pronounced. 
Single-celled beginnings are common in the fungi, because of the production of spores. In the case 
of the Basidiomycota, however, primary mycelia fuse to create dikaryotic, physiologically integrated, 
secondary mycelia. There is fusion between two unrelated individuals, creating a new physiological 
whole. This is similar to sex. However, dikaryotic fungal mycelia are unlike many other sexually 
produced offspring because karyogamy, the fusion of parental haploid nuclei, is delayed until 
reproductive structures develop. Heterokaryotic fungi thus contain nuclei from different origins, 
ensconced in a common cytoplasm, each contributing to the creation and maintenance of a 
common internal environment upon which they all depend for their continued persistence. There 
are some other organisms (some rhodophytes, e.g.) that exhibit this kind of heterokaryosis. 
However, the majority of organisms do not undergo a prolonged heterokaryotic developmental 
stage. The source of variation among nuclei in a basidiomycete fungus is distinctive, and different 
from the inevitable developmental mosaicism that can be found in plants and most animals (see 
Godfrey-Smith 2009 for a good discussion of mosacism). 
The material derived from one fungal sexual event may be spread over a wide area, and is not 
necessarily physiologically connected due to asexual reproduction and/or accidental physiological 
disruption. There is often very little integration between genetically identical or very similar mycelia. 
The suite of biological characteristics exhibited by fungi seems like a chaotic combination when 
compared to the characteristics of more familiar metazoan organisms. In particular, it is not at all 
clear what the fundamental selectional units are in fungal systems, and thus it isn’t clear how to 59 
discriminate evolutionary individuals or the populations that they make up. Understandably, there 
has been much debate about how to conceptualize fungal individuals (Buller 1931; Pontecorvo 1946; 
Buss 1987; Rayner 1991; Burnett 2003; Anderson and Kohn 2007; James et al. 2008). 
3.2  Darwinian Individuals: Genets, Mycelia, and Submycelial Elements 
One way to begin to answer questions about populations of heterokaryotic basidiomycete fungi is to 
investigate which features of fungi satisfy the minimal concept of a Darwinian population, 
articulated in Section 2. As Godfrey-Smith suggests, initially it’s best to have is a permissive and 
inclusive attitude. It will be possible to make more fine-grained distinctions later. In this section, I 
discuss and evaluate three kinds of entities that seem like prima facie plausible candidates for being 
Darwinian individuals that make up Darwinian populations: genets, mycelia, and submycelial 
elements. 
At this point it is necessary to borrow some terminology from plant biology. The terms “genet” 
and “ramet” are commonly used by plant biologists (Stout 1929; Harper 1977; Clarke 2011b). A 
ramet is a semi-autonomous repeatable structure such as an individual shoot, meristem, or plant (the 
unit that is treated as a ramet is often different for different plant groups). A genet consists of all the 
material that is produced as a result of one sexual event, the collective group of ramets that develop 
from a zygote. Some mycologists argue that these terms can be applied to fungi. Burnett makes the 
case: “One solution to the problem of identifying fungal individuals is to recognize that the 
functional unit is the mycelial clone and to adopt the term first coined to describe clonal higher 
plants, namely the genet, i.e. the product of single zygote… In the Basidiomycotina… the term 
genet is applied to the dikaryotic mycelium derived from the fusion of two monokaryons, 
themselves derived from individual basidiospores, i.e. the products of a single zygotic meiosis. 
Similarly, if a dikaryon reproduces asexually, its products are part of the same genet” (Burnett 2003, 
65). The suggestion here is that genetically homogeneous entities are relevant evolutionary units, 60 
regardless of whether or not they are physiologically contiguous or functionally integrated. This idea 
has been influential among biologists (Janzen 1977; cf. T. H. Huxley 1852). Contiguous mycelia, on 
this view, may be treated as ramets. Groups of genetically identical or very similar ramets would 
qualify as genets. 
Prima facie it seems plausible that a population of fungal genets satisfies the minimal concept of 
a Darwinian population. Each fungal genet, whether dikaryotic or monokaryotic, is genetically 
distinct. This ensures that any causally connected group of fungal genets will exhibit variation. Such 
variation could manifest itself in terms of differences in reproductive output. Distinct genets 
presumably have different survival and reproductive regimes, and hence different propensities to 
give rise to offspring genets. Moreover, sexual descendants of particular genets tend to resemble 
their parents more than they tend to resemble other individuals in the population. Genets pass the 
minimal test for being members of a Darwinian population. 
There are reasons, however, to resist categorizing physiologically noncontiguous genets as 
Darwinian individuals. Recall that Darwinian individuals are essentially reproducing entities. It is 
certainly possible to distinguish between growth and reproduction in fungal genets. Asexual 
production of spores and the resulting mycelia would count as growth of one individual as opposed 
to creation of a new one. But it is in thinking about these issues that problems begin to arise. Why 
should we think of several spatiotemporally scattered material parts as belonging to one collectively 
reproducing entity? This kind of thinking has historically been resisted (J. Huxley 1912); it should be 
resisted in this case as well. The main reason to resist treating fungal genets as Darwinian individuals 
has to do with the lack of functional integration of parts. Ramets comprising fungal genets are 
contiguous mycelia that are genetically identical. These ramets are not necessarily located near each 
other in time or space, and there is no reason to think that they are cooperating in any way. There is 
no division of labor or functional integration among noncontiguous mycelia, either physiological or 61 
reproductive. Genets themselves are too physiologically diffuse to count as collectively reproducing 
entities, as they score very low on Godfrey-Smith’s functional integration criterion. Fungal genets are 
only marginally reproducing entities (sensu Godfrey-Smith 2009). So fungal genets are not Darwinian 
individuals. 
There are, however, other fungal entities that may make good candidates for individuals that 
comprise Darwinian populations. The work of Alan Rayner, a mycologist who articulated the 
concept of the “individualistic mycelium”, can be recruited here. The individualistic mycelium, 
“envisaged somatic rejection responses as a mechanism maintaining the identity of individual 
mycelia within natural populations by preventing physiological integration with others of different 
genetic origin. In outcrossing basidiomycete populations, these individuals are secondary mycelia…” 
(1991, 57). The individualistic mycelium perspective is one in which the fungal ramet is given a 
privileged position as a biologically relevant individual. A fungal ramet is any physiologically contiguous 
mycelium, regardless of its genetic makeup (homokaryotic or heterokaryotic). If two ramets come 
into contact with one another and become physiologically integrated, that constitutes the creation of 
one individual where once there were two. If a somatic rejection response kicks in when the two 
ramets meet, then two physiologically distinct individuals remain. Do populations of fungal ramets, 
contiguous mycelia, satisfy the minimal concept of a Darwinian population? There is certainly 
variation among mycelia (though perhaps not much between ramets that are asexual clones of one 
another). The variation among ramets contributes to fitness differences between them. It is also the 
case that mycelial offspring will tend to resemble their parents, whether they are produced sexually 
or asexually. So the minimal criteria for a group of causally connected ramets being a Darwinian 
population are met. 
The individualistic mycelium perspective is not subject to the same criticism as the proposal that 
genets are Darwinian individuals. Individual mycelia are reproducing entities. The mechanisms 62 
underlying the multiplication of these organisms are diverse, but whether or not mycelia produce 
offspring is not in question. A mycelium can create offspring clonally, via physiological detachment 
of a chunk of mycelium or via the production of asexual reproductive structures and spores. Some 
mycelia also reproduce sexually, as in the production of basidiospores. Furthermore, there can be no 
doubt that an individual mycelium exhibits a much higher degree of functional integration and 
cohesion than a genet composed of many ramets that don’t interact. Mycelia are not spatially 
distributed in a way that threatens their integration in the same way that genets are. There are diverse 
parts working for the maintenance and reproduction of the whole. Even if the parts of contiguous 
mycelia aren’t seamlessly integrated and retain some independence from each other, as is probably 
the case in very large mycelia, the fact remains that they’re physiological wholes, unlike many fungal 
genets. Contiguous mycelia are Darwinian individuals that constitute Darwinian populations. 
As Rayner emphasizes, there are evolved mechanisms ensuring the integrity of individual 
mycelia: somatic incompatibility responses. Much current research focuses on mechanisms that 
regulate the tendency of various filamentous fungal mycelia to fuse with other mycelia to create (or 
prohibit the creation of) a new physiological whole (Glass and Kaneko 2003; Pawlowska 2005; 
Anderson and Kohn 2007; cf. Pradeu 2012). Somatic fusion is undoubtedly one of the causes of 
heterokaryotic mycelia in certain fungi. Contemporary research suggests that somatic fusion is 
limited to very close relatives. The argument is that limiting fusion in this way is an adaptive 
response to the potential problem of mycelial invasion by parasitic elements like viruses or 
competitive, uncooperative nuclei. Buss memorably makes the point: “Just as Haldane should have 
been content ‘to give his life for two sibs or eight cousins,’ a fungus should be equally willing to fuse 
with its close relatives, for fusion with close kin diminishes the potential costs of fusion while 
preserving its benefits” (1987, 155). One of the most promising areas of research in this area 
involves the articulation of models that explicitly treat somatic fusion in fungi as an aspect of social 63 
evolution (Aanen et al. 2008). That mycelia sometimes fuse with one another and sometimes do not 
reveals that they engage in fitness-affecting interactions with each other. This warrants treating them 
as composing a Darwinian population. Moreover, there is empirical evidence for mycelium-level 
evolution. Burnett documents cases of evolution for fungicide resistance in pathogens and selection 
for increased, or specific, pathogenicity under agricultural conditions (2003, 198 – 202). 
At this point it might be tempting to suppose that the question of fungal individuality has been 
sufficiently answered. Fungal individuals are contiguous mycelia; that’s all there is to say. However, 
part of what makes fungi so biologically unusual is that they’re often heterokaryotic, and this fact has 
led many mycologists to think of fungi in a fundamentally different way than the one I have so far 
articulated. 
At some point or other in the life cycle, many fungi go through a phase in which there are 
genetically distinct nuclei from two or more origins ensconced within a common cytoplasm. The 
dikaryotic stage of basidiomycete fungi is an example. This leads to the proposal that individual 
nuclei qualify as Darwinian individuals comprising their own Darwinian population. 
There are several phenomena that can occur during fungal growth and reproduction that result 
in the shuffling about of nuclei (for a recent review see Anderson and Kohn 2007). One type of 
nuclear transfer occurs when there is a di-mon mating (sometimes referred to as the “Buller 
phenomenon”). Monokaryotic primary mycelia sometimes pair with dikaryotic mycelia of the same 
species. The dikaryotic mycelium transfers one nuclear type to the monokaryotic partner. The result 
is a new dikaryotic individual mycelium, and the proliferation of one nuclear type from the original 
dikaryon. There is sometimes selection among the nuclei that get transferred to the monokaryon, as 
some nuclei seem to be preferred by monokaryotic individuals for unknown reasons (Webster and 
Weber 2007, 510). 64 
Indeed, many of the mechanisms underlying nuclear reassortment and transfer among mycelia 
are not well understood. These phenomena do take place, however, even among fungi that are 
somatically incompatible. Johannesson and Stenlid, for example, report that nuclear exchange occurs 
in a natural population of the basidiomycete fungal pathogen Heterobasidion annosum. Johannesson 
and Stenlid recognize that their data put pressure on the individualistic mycelium view: “The 
discovery of nuclear transfer and reassortment between heterokaryotic H. annosum mycelia 
challenges the concept of the individualistic mycelium. Strict control of an association between two 
nuclei is not maintained over time or space. Instead, the opportunity for homokaryotization gives 
rise to a degree of promiscuity and remating. The frequent remating between mycelia allows for 
traits inherited in a particular nucleus to be selected for in numerous combinations with other 
conspecific nuclei, each combination with its own domain and resources. Based on these data, the 
operational selection unit in basidiomycetes is the nucleus itself” (2004, 569). 
A perspective according to which fungal mycelia are themselves Darwinian arenas for 
populations of nuclei (and, perhaps, mitochondria) is not a new one (Pontecorvo 1946; Lewontin 
1970; Buss 1987). Here, for example, is Pontecorvo in 1946: “We may be justified in considering a 
hypha as a mass of cytoplasm with a population of nuclei. Such a population is subject to: (1) 
variation in numbers; (2) drift–i.e., random variation in the proportions of the different kinds of 
nucleus; (3) migration–i.e., influx and outflow of nuclei, following hyphal anastomoses; (4) mutation; 
and (5) selection” (1946, 199). 
Fungal nuclei maintain some degree of agency and potential for antisocial behavior, even when 
situated within a mycelium upon which they depend for their persistence and replication. These facts 
lead naturally to a view according to which nuclei are best treated as Darwinian individuals. In many 
systems, fungal nuclei clearly satisfy the minimal concept of a Darwinian population. There is 
variation among nuclei that can have an effect upon their reproductive success. Moreover, nuclei are 65 
high-fidelity replicating units, and thus satisfy the inheritance requirement. Hence, individual nuclei 
constitute a Darwinian population in fungal systems.
12 
I have argued that there are (at least) two salient Darwinian populations in heterokaryotic fungi. 
One population consists of individual mycelia. The other consists of submycelial elements, 
particularly nuclei (and perhaps mitochondria). Darwinian evolutionary change can potentially occur 
at each of these levels, though it is a different and further matter to determine how often such 
change actually occurs. That there are two levels of Darwinian populations in heterokaryotic fungi 
suggests that a multilevel perspective on fungal organismal organization is appropriate (for a 
multilevel perspective on organismality see Folse and Roughgarden 2010; for a multilevel perspective 
on plants see Clarke 2011b). A multilevel perspective not only reflects the structure of 
heterokaryotic fungal systems, but allows for the articulation of further interesting questions, which 
I discuss in the next section. A multilevel perspective on fungal organization is rarely explicitly 
articulated in the literature on fungal evolution. Most mycologists think of the selectional unit as 
being either mycelial (Rayner 1991; Burnett 2003) or nuclear (Pontecorvo 1946; Buss 1987; 
Johannesson and Stenlid 2004; Anderson and Kohn 2007; James et al. 2008). It is worth pointing 
out, however, that something akin to a multilevel perspective on fungi has been articulated by at least 
one mycologist, Rowland Davis: “In fact, any mycelium must be viewed simultaneously as an 
integrated organism and as a population of nuclei in a morphologically patterned cytoplasmic 
environment” (1966, 567).
13 
                                                 
12 An anonymous reviewer questioned whether nuclear pairs or septate mycelial compartments might be members of 
Darwinian populations. Neither of these structures reproduces in anything other than a marginal sense and so neither 
structure qualifies. 
13 Special thanks to David Haig (personal communication) for bringing this quote to my attention. 66 
4.  Moving Beyond the Minimal Concept 
The claim that there are two distinct Darwinian populations coexisting in heterokaryotic fungal 
systems invites a question about the relation that these two populations bear to each other. 
Answering this question requires moving beyond the minimal concept of a Darwinian population, 
and investigating more specific features of populations in fungi. The aim in this section is to make 
some headway toward an account of the precise relation between Darwinian populations of mycelia 
and submycelial elements in basidiomycete fungi. The focus will be on the characteristics of 
populations of submycelial elements. My discussion will be embedded within a larger set of issues 
pertaining to evolutionary transitions in individuality. 
There is a traditional view among biologists that individuals are genetically homogeneous 
(Santelices 1999). Part of what is distinctive about fungi is that the heterokaryotic condition basically 
ensures intraorganismal genetic heterogeneity. Nuclei from different origins not only cooperatively 
coexist in a common cytoplasmic environment, but sometimes they compete. Darwinian 
phenomena can occur at the nuclear level (Pontecorvo 1946; Johannesson and Stenlid 2004; 
Anderson and Kohn 2007; James et al. 2008). It is not at all clear that standard views about 
biological individuality, according to which entities that occupy the hierarchical level of the organism 
are genetically homogeneous, have the resources to clearly integrate these facts about fungal biology 
into a broader evolutionary theoretical context. 
My suggestion is that Godfrey-Smith’s Darwinian populations framework can be brought to bear 
in a way that helpfully illuminates certain features that are characteristic of heterokaryotic fungi. Just 
because a population satisfies the minimal concept does not mean that it is evolutionarily significant. 
As Godfrey-Smith notes, “A summary citing just variation, heredity, and fitness differences does not 
distinguish the events that gave us eyes and brains from a dull process of sorting fixed types within a 
population” (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 41). Darwinian populations that generate complex adaptations 67 
have features that other more mundane Darwinian populations do not have. Just what kind of 
evolution a population will undergo depends on many parameters. In what follows, I will discuss two 
important and variable characteristics of Darwinian populations, viz., variation and competition 
(Godfrey-Smith’s V and α parameters; see his 2009 Chapter 3). I examine the roles that these 
characteristics play in populations of submycelial elements in heterokaryotic fungi. I employ a 
comparative perspective. 
Darwinian individuals often have parts that are themselves Darwinian individuals; fungi are not 
unusual in this regard. Consider a particular human being. That human being is a Darwinian 
individual in virtue of its capacity for reproduction and its causal connection to other reproducing 
human beings. Now consider the cells that make up that particular human being. The cells are 
themselves Darwinian individuals. They vary and reproduce at different rates. However, the cells of a 
particular human being do not constitute the kind of Darwinian population that generates complex, 
adaptive change at the level of the cell. This is, of course, good for the individual human. Selective 
processes occurring among the parts of human being tend to decrease the fitness of that individual 
(consider, e.g., meiotic drive and cancer). 
A human being has certain evolved mechanisms that make its parts less Darwinian. The 
population of cells that make up a human being has been “de-Darwinized,” as Godfrey-Smith puts 
it (2009, 100–103). A human’s cells are all very closely related to each other in virtue of their recent 
descent from an initial zygotic cell. The zygotic single-celled bottleneck serves to reduce the variation 
among the cells that make up the human being. The bottleneck also enables, but does not compel, a 
high degree of cooperation between a human’s cells; their fitnesses are aligned in virtue of their close 
kinship. 
Another reason that the cells of a human being aren’t usually competitive has to do with the 
existence of germ tissue in the organism. Germ cells are sequestered early in the ontogeny of a 68 
human being, ensuring that all the non-germ parts of that human being (the soma) will work for the 
good of those germ cells. If somatic parts were to become sufficiently uncooperative, then none of 
that individual’s parts would be passed on to the next generation. So single-celled bottlenecks and 
sequestered germ lines are (evolved) mechanisms that de-Darwinize a population of cells that makes 
up a multicellular entity by reducing the variation that exists in those cells, and by enforcing 
cooperation among them (Grosberg and Strathmann 2007; Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
These mechanisms are often treated as central in discussions about evolutionary transitions in 
individuality (Buss 1987; Michod 1999; Calcott and Sterelny 2011). From the Darwinian populations 
perspective, these are, “transitions that involve the origin of new kinds of biological individual” 
(Godfrey-Smith 2009, 122; Godfrey-Smith 2011a). The transition that is most relevant in the context 
of fungal evolution is the transition to multicellularity. Reproducing multicellular entities have 
evolved independently several times, and in several ways, from aggregates of single-celled organisms 
(Grosberg and Strathmann 2007). Suppression of conflict among lower-level entities is often taken 
to be necessary for the evolution of a higher-level individual. Reduction in variation, and 
concomitant alignment of fitness of lower-level entities, is one way to achieve suppression of 
conflict. Germ line sequestration is another. Organisms that begin life as a single cell and sequester 
their germ lines early in ontogeny are often taken to be paradigmatic biological individuals (cf. Buss 
1987). 
Thinking about heterokaryotic fungi from the perspective of the Darwinian populations 
framework and its approach to transitions in individuality sheds some light on these systems. Fungal 
mycelia, I have argued, have parts that are themselves Darwinian individuals: nuclei. However, there 
is more variation among nuclei in a heterokaryotic mycelium than there is among a population of 
endogenous cells that constitute a particular human being. All endogenous cells in human being are 
descended from that individual’s zygote. Inevitable somatic mutations during development create 69 
genetic variation among these cells. Nevertheless, the cells will be very similar to one another 
because they are so recently descended from a common ancestor. By contrast, the nuclei within a 
heterokaryotic fungus have genetically distinct ancestors. The source of variation among the nuclei 
is thus not limited to mutation during mitotic division, but also occurs because of nuclear 
reassortment and transfer among conspecifics. This inevitably leads to more competition between those 
submycelial nuclei than there is between the endogenous cells of a well-functioning human being. 
Nuclear populations in heterokaryotic fungi have not been de-Darwinized to nearly the same extent 
that human cells have. The population of nuclei in a heterokaryotic fungal mycelium is closer to a 
paradigm Darwinian population than the cells in an individual human being are because they score 
higher on the V and  parameters. The evolutionary forces at work among the parts of a mycelium 
are thus potentially much stronger than those acting on the parts of a human being. It is this fact 
that justifies the approach taken by some mycologists who treat nuclei as constituting a Darwinian 
population in their own right. 
Darwinian processes occurring on parts of a human being tend to have adverse effects on the 
fitness of that individual. Competition and evolution at the lower level threaten the integrity of the 
entity at the higher level. Human beings and other animals have therefore evolved mechanisms that 
severely limit the possibility for Darwinian processes to occur at the cellular or genetic level. 
It is possible to raise questions about fungi, however. If there is so much variation and potential 
conflict among the nuclei that are parts of a heterokaryotic mycelium, why doesn’t the whole 
disintegrate? What keeps an individual mycelium together given that some form of natural selection 
regularly occurs among its parts? These questions seem pressing only given the assumption that 
processes of selection taking place at the lower level will always have an adverse effect on the higher-
level entity, as they do in human beings. But multilevel selection theory does not dictate that this 70 
must be a general rule. It is possible that fungi have evolved to maintain a limited amount of 
variation and competition in at least some of the parts that make up a mycelial network. 
Recent work in biology has recognized that intraorganismal genetic heterogeneity (IGH) is much 
more common than has traditionally been recognized, and this has influenced discussion about 
biological individuality (Pineda‐ Krch and Lehtilä 2004; Hutchings and Booth 2004; Tuomi 2004). In 
particular, it has been suggested that there are potential benefits to a higher-level organism in having 
parts that themselves participate in Darwinian processes (Otto and Hastings 1998; Pineda‐ Krch and 
Lehtilä 2004; Clarke 2011b). This suggestion is somewhat at odds with the traditional literature on 
transitions in individuality, which tends toward the view that suppression of conflict at the lower 
level is necessary for the evolution of adapted higher-level entities. Tuomi remarks that, “With regards 
to the evolution of individuality, one may further question whether the restriction of IGH really is 
the defining issue in the transition from a lower to a higher level” (2004, 1183). 
Heterokaryotic fungi are a good model system for thinking about these issues. There are several 
possible advantageous effects that IGH may have on an organism, at least one of which is relevant 
to fungi: synergism (Buss 1982; Pineda‐ Krch and Lehtilä 2004). Synergism occurs when, 
“genetically distinct lineages interact so that their combined phenotype is different from the sum of 
their separate phenotypes” (Pineda‐ Krch and Lehtilä 2004, 1172). In fungal systems, synergism is 
sometimes exhibited in the phenomenon of “chimeric vigor,” in which a chimeric fungal individual, 
the product of mycelial fusion, is better able to exploit the resources in its environment than either 
of its genetic constituents could on its own (Pontecorvo 1946; Buss 1982). Evolution would 
presumably favor the capacity of fungi to somatically fuse in situations in which the environmental 
conditions would make it adaptive. IGH is thus plausibly an adaptation in at least some fungi, at least 
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When it comes to the prevalence of somatic fusion in fungi, however, it is best to maintain a 
cautious attitude. Somatic fusion can be a very risky endeavor, as it invites potential parasites and 
makes possible an arena for competition among cheating conspecifics (Grosberg and Strathmann 
2007). Though it was once thought that hyphal fusion is ubiquitous in fungi (Buller 1931), fusions 
are now believed to be limited to close kin or even genetically identical mycelia for many species 
(Buss 1987; Rayner 1991; Glass and Kaneko 2003; Webster and Weber 2007; Aanen et al. 2008). 
Undoubtedly, hyphal fusion does occur and can result in evolutionary phenomena among nuclear 
populations (Johannesson and Stenlid 2004; Anderson and Kohn 2007; James et al. 2008). 
It is thus implausible to suggest that IGH regularly results in evolutionary processes among 
submycelial elements that threaten mycelial integrity. There is no doubt that nuclei are shuffled 
about among different mycelia via mechanisms that are not well-understood, and that such shuffling 
is sometimes but not always adaptive for the mycelia that harbor them (Johannesson and Stenlid 
2004; Anderson and Kohn 2007; James et al. 2008). In general, however, fungal nuclei within a 
mycelium do not constitute the kind of Darwinian population in which competition is so intense as 
to render the mycelium unable to persist. Even though there is some IGH and submycelial selection 
in fungi which appears to be adaptive and actively maintained, there is enough mycelial control over 
that heterogeneity that competition does not result in a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968), a 
disintegration of the mycelium (though James et al. 2008 emphasize the cost to the mycelium of 
reproductive competition among nuclei). Mycelial individuals maintain their status as organisms, 
despite the existence of substantial amounts of IGH. 
There are several mechanisms that serve to regulate competition between nuclei in 
heterokaryotic fungi. First, fungi, like many other organisms, routinely go through single-celled 
bottlenecks at various points during growth and reproduction; spores are the primary delivery 
system of fungal DNA. These bottlenecks function the same way in fungi that they do in other 72 
organisms: to limit variation in genetic material of a developing individual (Grosberg and 
Strathmann 2007). Second, in secondary mycelia in basidiomycete fungi, clamp connections regularly 
occur. These are complex and distinctive hyphal adaptations that limit competition between nuclei in 
the dikaryotic phase of the life cycle. The functional role of clamp connections is to regulate the 
mitotic divisions of haploid nuclei in such a way that neither of the nuclei can outreproduce the 
other (Buss 1987). Clamp connections ensure that each septate cell in a mycelium contains just one 
mitotic descendant of each parental nucleus. The third fungal mechanism that regulates competition 
between nuclei is heterokaryon incompatibility, a nonself recognition system. This involves the 
genetically programmed cell death of anastomoses (fusion) of mycelia among incompatible fungi 
(Glass and Kaneko 2003). 
There is no division between germ and soma tissue in fungi until late in their development, 
immediately before spore formation. Thus, fungi simply do not employ one of the evolved 
mechanisms that many animals do to enforce cooperation between their parts. There are two 
evolutionary consequences of this delay in the production of germ tissue in fungi. First, it is 
plausibly adaptive for fungi not to sequester germ material early in development. As I’ve noted, IGH 
is common in mycelia. It can arise via fusion, or via mutation of nuclear material during mitotic 
division. In either case, a possible scenario is that, due to its genetic properties, a particular sector of 
a mycelium may be more efficient than the rest of the mycelium at exploiting external resources or 
engaging in some metabolic activity (Anderson and Kohn 2007). This might make the mycelium 
fitter overall. It would be adaptive for that mycelium to relegate resources for spore production to 
the fitter part of the mycelium, and not to the less fit parts. In this kind of scenario, something akin 
to germ line selection would occur over the ontogeny of the fungal mycelium. Deleterious 
mutations would be eliminated by a process of selection between submycelial elements, and the 
mycelium as whole would become fitter. There would be concordant selection between the 73 
population of submycelial elements and the mycelium that harbors them precisely because there is 
delayed germ tissue production (Otto and Orive 1995; Otto and Hastings 1998). 
Another evolutionary consequence of delaying the formation of germ tissue involves the 
prospects for further downstream evolution. If an organism sequesters germ tissue early in 
ontogeny, then there is a sense in which the evolutionary fates of the parts of the organism have 
been tied together. Every part’s eggs have been put into one basket, and now every part has to work 
for the good of the whole if it is to make it to the next generation. Once this kind of structure is in 
place, heterogeneous parts that work harmoniously as a whole will tend to evolve (Dawkins 1982; 
Godfrey-Smith 2009; Folse and Roughgarden 2010). 
In fungi, however, there is no guarantee that all the parts of the organism have the same fate. 
Germ tissue can arise in any part of a mycelium that exhibits IGH. This means that the structure 
necessary for the evolution of functional integration of heterogeneous parts is not necessarily in 
place in heterokaryotic fungi. This may explain why fungi are not typically viewed as being as 
complex as some other organisms, animals in particular. It is possible that the delay in germ tissue 
formation precludes an evolutionary trajectory in which fungi might evolve to become significantly 
more complex. Of course, there is some debate about just how a term like “complexity” ought to be 
used in biological discourse, so I advance this idea with caution. In a similar vein, there might be a 
tendency to treat fungi as organisms that are somehow “stuck in the middle” of an evolutionary 
transition. Fungi don’t have germ tissue and their parts don’t fully cooperate, which might render 
their individuality or organismality suspect. Someone might argue that fungi are, at best, degenerate 
organisms. They aspire to, but haven’t quite made it all the way to, full individuality (cf. Huxley 
1912). I suggest that such a perspective is not warranted. Heterokaryotic fungal mycelia are full-
fledged organisms and full-fledged individuals. They have the characteristics they do because of 
their evolutionary etiology and their ecological requirements. The fact that they have historically 74 
caused conceptual trouble for mycologists concerned with understanding populations and the 
individuals that comprise them is not relevant to their status as biological individuals. The trouble 
stems from limited theoretical resources, not from the structural and causal facts about fungi 
themselves. 
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ESSAY FOUR: INDIVIDUALITY AND THE ATTINE LEAF CUTTER ANTS 
1.  Introduction 
Ant colonies have long been seen as analogous to organisms. They have distinct parts that serve 
different functions in the colony, and the parts tend to behave in a unified, adaptive way, just as they 
do in organisms. Some ant colonies, members of the Attini tribe, have even evolved agriculture. 
Every species in this group cultivates a fungus, which serves a very important nutritional role for the 
colony. 
The focus of this essay is the natural history of the higher attine fungus farming ants. After 
explaining some important background regarding the superorganism framework and some classical 
theories about the evolution of superorganisms, I assess higher attine colonial ants in the light of 
the two categories of biological individuality introduced in “On the Theoretical Roles of Biological 
Individuality.” I argue for a superorganismal extension of the holobiont category to higher attine 
colonies and their fungal symbionts. I argue that attine colonial holobionts are tightly integrated 
organisms. I also argue that they engage in community level reproductive processes. Higher attine 
holobionts are not only exemplars of higher-level organisms but also higher-level Darwinian 
individuals. 
2.  The Superorganism Framework 
In 1910, the Harvard myrmecologist William Morton Wheeler delivered a lecture at the Marine 
Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, Massachusetts entitled “The Ant-Colony as an Organism” 
(1911). In the lecture, he made the case that entire ant colonies, composed of many (sometimes 
many thousands) individual ants, are not just analogous to organisms, but that they literally are 76 
organisms. Wheeler documented the ways in which ant colonies participate in the biological 
processes he took to be the most important characteristics of organismality. According to Wheeler, 
“An organism is a complex, definitely coordinated and therefore individualized system of activities, 
which are primarily directed to obtaining and assimilating substances from an environment, to 
producing other similar systems, known as offspring, and to protecting the system itself and usually 
also its offspring from disturbances emanating from the environment” (1911, 308). His paper 
centers around these three “fundamental activities” of organismality, viz., nutrition, reproduction, 
and protection, and the ways in which they’re instantiated in ant colonies. 
Wheeler’s lecture represents an important moment in the biology of the social insects, one that 
has led to a great deal of research, both theoretical and empirical, about the nature of colony-level 
organization. Wheeler himself later used the term “superorganism” to describe ant colonies (1928), 
a term which is still widely used today. Though Wheeler’s original lecture did not make use of the 
term, it did make three important contributions toward developing the superorganism framework, 
aspects of which are still employed in contemporary discussions. 
One of Wheeler’s important contributions was to emphasize and describe in detail the division 
of labor of different ant types within a colony. There are often morphologically distinct castes in ant 
societies that have specific functions within the nest. There is sometimes a distinction between 
workers and soldiers, for example, and the roles played by these different castes roughly correspond 
to Wheeler’s nutritive and protective capacities of colony-level organization. One thing that workers 
and soldiers have in common, however, is that they are not reproductively active; at no point during 
their life cycle do they produce offspring. This leads to perhaps the most important aspect of the 
division of labor in ant colonies, one that can be characterized as a reproductive division of labor. 
Wheeler recognized a division between the germ and soma in an ant colony, i.e., a distinction 
between those parts of a colony that are capable of creating an offspring colony and those that are 77 
directed merely at the persistence of the nest. He explicitly compared ant reproductives and workers 
to germ and soma tissues in human beings and other multicellular animals. Individual ants belonging 
to sterile worker castes provide resources and services directed at the survival and reproduction of 
the queen, the sole member of the colony that produces offspring. In mature colonies, queens 
produce other reproductive individuals: males and incipient queens. These individuals eventually 
mate, and subsequently attempt to found new colonies. Wheeler explicitly compares a fertilized 
queen ant to a unicellular zygote, a cell that ultimately develops into a multicellular organism (1911, 
312). 
This leads directly to a second contribution of Wheeler’s that has continued relevance for 
thinking about the biological organization of colonies. Wheeler argued that there are repeatable and 
stable ontogenetic processes in an ant colony, just as there are in developing multicellular organisms. 
Colonies, that is, have life cycles. I will discuss the details of a particular kind of colonial life cycle 
later in this essay, but at this point it suffices to say that there are some universal developmental traits 
among ant colonies. In mature colonies, a queen produces an egg that is destined to develop into 
another queen. After the offspring goes through the larval and pupal stage, she departs from the 
nest on her nuptial flight, during which she mates with one or more males from different nests. 
After locating a suitable colony site, she lays eggs that develop into workers, sometimes of distinct 
castes. The colony grows in size as the workers engage in cooperative behavior in support of the 
colony and most importantly the queen as she continues to lay eggs. Once a colony matures, the 
queen lays fertilized eggs, destined to become queens, and unfertilized eggs, which develop into 
males. Both these types of individuals leave the nest, mate with other reproductively active ants from 
other nests, and settle down to found new colonies, thus continuing the cycle (cf. Hölldobler and 
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One emphasis of Wheeler’s was that the relevant reproductive capacities in ant societies are at 
the level of the colony. This is important, because it leads directly to Wheeler’s third contribution to 
thinking about ant colonies as organisms: colonies exhibit phylogenetic relationships. It is possible, 
that is, to track relations of ancestry and descent among colonies themselves, and not necessarily 
possible to do so for individual ants that are parts of colonies. The reason is that most individual 
ants in a colony never themselves reproduce, and in fact are incapable of reproduction, which entails 
that they cannot be parts of lineages. (This is a way in which worker ants are not like the cells of a 
multicellular organism, which undergo mitotic division during development and are thus parts of 
lineages.) Because ant colonies produce offspring colonies, however, there are lineage relations at the 
colony level. It is therefore possible to understand the phylogenetic relationships between various 
kinds of ants, and to track their evolutionary relationships. I will say more about the particular case 
of the higher attine ants later on. 
In sum, Wheeler explicated three guiding ideas for thinking about colonies as organisms: 
colonies exhibit division of labor, especially a distinction between reproductive and nonreproductive 
parts; colonies exhibit ontogenetic patterns and hence life cycles; reproductive relations between 
colonies ground phylogenetic relations of ancestry and descent at the colony level. 
Each of these aspects of ant colony organization has been elaborated on and explored by 
myrmecologists in the years following Wheeler’s lecture. One important example is that of Alfred 
Emerson, a researcher at the University of Chicago during the middle twentieth century, and an 
expert on termites. In the 1930’s, Emerson set out to, “show the ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
correlations between the organism and the insect society, to reexamine the evidence for considering 
the animal society a superorganism, and to indicate some of the biological significance of the 
concept” (Emerson 1939, 183). Emerson covered much of the same ground that Wheeler did, 
including the parallel between social insect castes and cellular division of labor in animals, life cycles 79 
and ontogenetic processes of insect colonies, and phylogenetic relationships between colony level 
reproductive units. Despite a lull in its use during the 1960’s (Hölldobler and Wilson 1994, 111), the 
concept of superorganismality as applied to insect colonies has been enthusiastically endorsed in 
more recent years, by both biologists and philosophers of biology (D. S. Wilson and Sober 1989; 
Hölldobler and Wilson 1994; 2009; Moffett 2011; A. Hamilton, Smith, and Haber 2009; Haber 2013; 
Bouchard 2013). Hölldobler and Wilson, in particular, have described in detail what they see as the 
functional parallels between an organism and a colonial superorganism. Organismic cells correspond 
to superorganismic colony members; organismic organs correspond to superorganismic castes. They 
even go so far as to suggest that there are parallels to an organism’s immune, circulatory, and 
nervous systems in the defensive castes, food and pheremone distribution, and communicative 
capacities of superorganisms, respectively (see Tale 5-1, Hölldobler and Wilson 2009, 85). 
Much of the interest in superorganismality is directed at understanding their evolution. Though 
Wheeler believed that superorganisms are the product of evolution, his 1910 lecture did not deal 
with evolutionary questions in any great detail. The recognition that the biological hierarchy extends 
beyond the level of the individual organism, however, certainly invites questions about how such 
higher-level entities might come to be. The evolutionary issues posed by ant colonies are actually 
classical problems for evolutionary theory and go back at least as far as Darwin’s On the Origin of  
Species. Darwin viewed the existence of sterile worker castes in insect societies to be the, “one special 
difficulty, which at first appeared to me insuperable, and actually fatal to my whole theory” (1966, 
236). Darwin understood neuter insect castes as a grave theoretical problem for two reasons: they 
are examples of altruistic behavior and they do not reproduce. The problem of altruism is one that 
has received a great deal of attention among theoretical biologists, so I won’t discuss it in detail here. 
What is important for this essay is that sterile worker ants are altruistic to an extreme degree. They 
often repeatedly put their lives in danger, whether through foraging for or protecting the nest, and 80 
many do lose their lives, all for the good of the colony as a whole. The problem of altruism in this 
context is roughly the problem of explaining how such individuals could proliferate, given their 
extremely altruistic behavioral proclivities. The prima facie difficulty about altruism takes on a 
different character when certain other facts are taken on board, viz., that individuals belonging to 
workers castes in ant colonies are both sterile and morphologically distinctive: “with the working 
ant we have an insect differing greatly from its parents, yet absolutely sterile; so that it could 
never have transmitted successively acquired modifications of structure or instinct to its progeny. 
It may well be asked how is it possible to reconcile this case with the theory of natural 
selection?” (Darwin 1966, 237). 
Darwin’s response was to argue that the process of natural selection is not working on individual 
ant organisms in this case, but rather on the community of ants as a whole: “a slight modification 
of structure, or instinct, correlated with the sterile condition of certain members of the 
community, has been advantageous to the community: consequently the fertile males and 
females of the same community flourished, and transmitted to their fertile offspring a tendency 
to produce sterile members having the same modification” (1966, 238). 
There is a sense in which Darwin can be seen as advocating something akin to a 
superorganism perspective in the quote above. In general, Darwin understood individual 
organisms to be the primary units or foci of selection processes. Given the details of colony-
level organization, however, he felt compelled to treat whole insect colonies as organism-like, at 
least in evolutionary contexts. In the decades following the publication of Darwin’s Origin, 
debates about the levels or units of selection began to achieve theoretical prominence in biology, 
resulting in a gigantic literature that is still actively discussed (see Okasha 2006). Darwin’s 
solution to the problem of neuter insect castes has been endorsed by numerous others. 81 
Weismann is a notable nineteenth century example: “In respect of selection, the whole state (ant 
colony) behaves as a single animal; the state is selected, not the single individuals; and the various 
forms behave exactly like the parts of one individual in the course of ordinary selection” (1893, 
326–327). Similar views have been articulated more recently as well (see, e.g., D. S. Wilson and Sober 
1989). 
A somewhat different perspective on the evolution of social insect colonies was developed by 
William Hamilton in the 1960’s. Hamilton suggested that hymenoptera, the taxonomic group 
composed of bees, wasps, and ants, possess certain genetic properties that make them much more 
likely than other communities to evolve socially coordinated behavior: they exhibit haplodiploidy. 
The crucial starting point for understanding Hamilton’s argument is that females in an ant colony are 
diploid; they have two sets of chromosomes, one derived from their father and one derived from 
their mother. Males, on the other hand, are haploid; they only have one set of chromosomes derived 
from their mother. Colonies as a whole thus contain both haploid and diploid individuals (this is 
haplodiploidy). These genetic details ensure certain kinds of relatedness between the individuals that 
inhabit a colony. A queen shares half her genes with both her daughters and sons, which is usual in 
the animal world. A female worker ant, however, shares three quarters of her genes with her sisters, 
because each has the same genes from her father (who can only supply one set of genes due to his 
haploidy). By contrast, a male only shares one quarter of his genes with his sisters, due to the fact 
that he has no father, and only gets one meiotic complement of genes from his mother. Hamilton 
argued that these unusual genetic facts predispose colonies toward the evolution of social behavior. 
The interest of a female worker ant is to be part of a colony that raises as many sisters as possible, 
for this raises the probability that their shared genes will be passed on to the next generation via a 
sister who ultimately becomes a queen. By contrast, a male ant’s interest is based not in caring for his 
sisters, with whom he does not share a substantial complement of genes, but rather in being part of 82 
a colony that raises just enough brothers to successfully mate with a queen and found a new colony, 
thereby passing on his genes to the next generation (W. D. Hamilton 1964; cf. Hölldobler and 
Wilson 1994). 
Hamilton’s insights have received a great deal of discussion in the evolutionary literature. I’ll 
limit my remarks to two, however. First, Hamilton is sometimes seen as advocating a kind of gene’s 
eye perspective, according to which genes are the fundamental units of natural selection, and 
operate to enhance their own fitness by increasing the probability that their copies survive (cf. 
Dawkins 1976). Not everybody agrees with this interpretation, however. A different way of 
understanding Hamilton’s arguments about the evolution of sociality in haplodiploid colonies is 
individualistic; organisms are the relevant evolutionary units. Still others interpret Darwin’s 
community-level selection hypothesis as being a precursor of Hamiltonian ideas, which appears to 
suggest that Hamilton advocates a kind of group selection (Hölldobler and Wilson 1994). A 
discussion of the conceptual and semantic distinctions at play in this debate would take us too far 
afield (but see West, Griffin, and Gardner 2007). I wish to avoid getting derailed by these difficult 
distinctions, and will therefore discuss my preferred way of understanding the units of selection 
issue in the next section. As for my second remark, there are certain empirical details suggesting that 
Hamilton’s story about the evolution of sociality in ants may be idealized in an important way. In 
particular, it is now known that there is substantial variation in the number of males with whom 
queens mate during their nuptial flights in various species. The result is that it is not the case that all 
the sister workers in a colony necessarily share three quarters of their genes; sisters inhabiting the 
same nest may have different fathers and hence different complements of paternal genes. Female 
workers, of course, may preferentially aid the sisters and incipient queens with which they are most 
closely related (Hölldobler and Wilson 1994, 101). It remains the case, however, that the details of 
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To conclude this section, I would like to suggest that the superorganism framework consists of 
two biologically informed perspectives that are sometimes not clearly distinguished. On the one 
hand, there has been a great deal of interest in the evolution of superorganismal complexity. There is 
widespread agreement that ant colonies evolve, and many would agree that their evolution requires 
some special type of explanation, usually kin or group selection. A focus that is exclusively 
evolutionary, however, tends to downplay various other important and biologically relevant details 
about colonial complexity. Older discussions of superorganismality, such as those of Wheeler and 
Emerson, often treat evolutionary considerations and processes as being theoretically on par with 
other kinds of biological considerations, such as the physiological and ecological details of colonial 
superorganisms. Though the evolutionary details are relevant for my later arguments, I think it is 
important to maintain an openness to the potential relevance of other kinds of biological processes 
and theories in assessing the superorganismal details of the higher attine ant colonies. 
3.  Two Kinds of Individuality 
Recall Wheeler’s assertion that “An organism is a complex, definitely coordinated and therefore 
individualized system of activities” (Wheeler 1911, 308). Wheeler clearly conceives of an ant colony 
as a biological individual, with specifically organismal characteristics. In this section, I would like to 
briefly review some organizing concepts, drawn from other essays in this dissertation. The goal is to 
connect the superorganism framework with a more general framework of biological individuality, 
thereby setting the stage for some arguments in the next section. 
Recall the distinction in “On the Theoretical Roles of Biological Individuality” between 
evolutionary individuals and organism-individuals. There, I suggest that organism-individuals are 
best conceived as essentially persisting entities that harvest and assimilate nutrients from their 
environment and participate in homeostatic physiological, metabolic, and immunological processes. 84 
Wheeler explicitly mentions various fundamental activities of superorganisms that quite neatly 
designate them as falling into a similar kind of category. Organisms, he says, engage in activities, 
“which are primarily directed to obtaining and assimilating substances from an environment… and 
to protecting the system itself and usually also its offspring from disturbances emanating from the 
environment” (Wheeler 1911, 308). This aspect of the superorganism framework emphasizes the 
proximal organismal capacities of ant colonies, like their capacity to develop, metabolize, protect 
themselves, and persist through environmental changes. 
These capacities are distinct from reproductive capacities, which play the distinctive biological 
role of connecting colonies together intergenerationally via lineages of ancestry and descent. 
Reproduction is crucial for the capacity of ant colonies to participate in evolutionary processes. 
Recall the Darwinian individual category as articulated in “On the Theoretical Roles of Biological 
Individuality” (cf. Godfrey-Smith 2009). Darwinian individuals are essentially reproducers, and it is 
in virtue of their capacity to reproduce that they have the potential to be units of selection and parts 
of evolving populations. Darwinian individuals can be found at any level of the biological hierarchy 
in which reproductive capacities are located. Ant colonies, argues Wheeler, reproduce. Wheeler can 
therefore be seen as advocating something akin to the idea that ant colonies are selectable units that 
have the capacity to be parts of colonial populations that evolve via Darwinian mechanisms. I will 
say much more about the reproductive capacities of the higher attine ants in the next section. 
Wheeler’s superorganism framework emphasizes properties and capacities of colonies that are 
relevant to both evolutionary individuality and organism-individuality as articulated in “On the 
Theoretical Roles of Biological Individuality.” Wheeler’s framework does not clearly distinguish 
between the two biological roles that these properties and capacities might play. One contribution of 
the framework articulated in “On the Theoretical Roles of Biological Individuality” is to make these 
different roles explicit. 85 
One other category that will be relevant in the next section is the category of the holobiont, 
which is discussed at length in “Symbiosis, Selection, and Individuality” (Booth 2014a). A traditional 
holobiont is an entity that consists of a multicellular macrobe and all of its symbiotic microbial 
partners (Mindell 1992; Gordon et al. 2013). The holobiont category was not originally intended to 
be used to designate colonies or groups of conspecific individuals in conjunction with their 
symbiotic partner(s), but such an extension of the category is actually quite natural and useful 
(Gordon et al. 2013). The next section contains a discussion of the extended holobiont category. 
Recall that many biologists have recently claimed that holobionts are Darwinian units, parts of 
evolving populations in the same sense as organisms traditionally understood (Zilber-Rosenberg and 
Rosenberg 2008; Dupré and O’Malley 2012a). In “Symbiosis, Selection, and Individuality” I argue 
that this kind of view is perhaps too permissive, including many entities that should not be 
considered units of selection (Booth 2014a). This set of issues arises again in the next section. 
4.  The Higher Attines 
I now transition into a discussion of the particular group of ants which will be the subject of the 
remainder of this essay: the attine leaf cutter ants. Leaf cutter ants are members of the tribe Attini, 
a monophyletic group consisting of around 230 species spread throughout the New World, all of 
which depend upon the cultivation of fungus as their primary source of food (Schultz and Brady 
2008). All ants in this group participate in agricultural practices, and are involved in an obligate 
symbiosis with a fungal cultivar. There is substantial variation among the Attini in terms of colony 
size, fungal cultivar specificity, and polymorphism among nest members. The attine leaf cutter ants 
have achieved the most derived state among the Attini tribe; they are often referred to as the “higher 
attines,” and their colonies have been characterized as the “ultimate superorganism” (Hölldobler and 
Wilson 2009). The group comprises members of the genera Atta and Acromyrmex, and includes a 86 
known 39 species (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009, 411). The leaf cutters are notable among the Attini 
for having huge colony sizes, sometimes composed of millions of individual ants. They are 
distinctive for their abilities to forage large amounts organic material (such as leaves, flowers, and 
grasses) from the area surrounding their nest, to transport it to the nest via highway systems, and to 
process it extensively to create a suitable substrate on which to grow their very specific fungal 
cultivar. 
These tasks are achieved by several distinctive morphological types, which vary greatly in size, 
and which each have a specific function with respect to the activities of the nest. The division of 
labor is organized as follows. Members of the nest who travel furthest locate and begin to cut leaves 
and other organic debris with their large mandibles. They then transport the material, holding it aloft 
as they walk to a different site closer to the nest. At this point, these large workers drop the material 
and return to whence they came to continue their harvest. Workers of a smaller caste proceed to cut 
the material into smaller chunks, which are then delivered to a site still closer to the nest. This 
process continues until the organic matter is placed inside the nest. At this point, even smaller 
workers take on the task of processing the leaves through further, more fine-grained cutting and 
mastication until it has become suitable to serve as a substrate for cultivating fungus. Workers then 
carefully install the vegetative matter into a subterranean fungus “chamber”, creating more ground 
upon which their symbiotic fungus can proliferate. Miniscule workers tend the fungal garden, 
helping to keep it free of invasive and harmful fungal and bacterial pathogens. Throughout the 
process of transporting the organic material to the nest site, workers defecate upon it, depositing 
enzymes that begin to break it down and create an environment on which the fungus can grow. The 
workers involved in this process exhibit a tremendous amount of variation in size, the largest being 
many times bigger than their sisters (cf. Moffett 2011). 87 
There is some diversity in the fungal cultivars of the tribe Attini. The higher attines, however, 
associate with a very specific fungal type, a member of the family Leucocoprineae (in the fungal 
phylum Basidiomycota: order Agaricales) (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009, 409). It is estimated that the 
higher attines have been associated with their particular fungal strain for approximately ten million 
years, though the association between fungi and other members of the Attini goes back about 50 
million years (Schultz and Brady 2008). The fungal cultivar associated with the higher attines exhibits 
some distinctive biological features. First, it develops specialized and derived structures called 
gongylidia, lipid-rich hyphal tips that are swollen into nutritional fruitlike structures which are 
consumed and distributed by the ants inside the nest (Moffett 2011; Schultz and Brady 2008, 5438). 
Gongylidia are taken to be evidence that the fungi have evolved to benefit the ants. Second, the 
fungal cultivars are not known to produce sexual structures or basidiocarps (mushrooms), 
suggesting that they are exclusively clonally reproduced among ant nests. This has made the 
identification of the fungus difficult for biologists, due to the fact that fruiting bodies are 
taxonomically distinctive structures among fungi (Chapela et al. 1994, 1692). Third, the fungus is 
apparently unable to survive in the wild without the activities of leaf cutter ants; each party is 
engaged in an obligate symbiosis (Schultz and Brady 2008, 5437). The cultivated fungus is the main 
source of nutrition for larvae, pupae, and workers within the nest (those individuals cutting leaves 
outside the nest receive a great deal of nutritional support from the leaves and other organic 
material they process) (Moffett 2011). 
One aspect of the relationship between the fungi and their associated ant colonies is particularly 
striking, and will play an important role in my arguments later on. Comparative phylogenetic 
research on the higher attines and their cultivated fungi shows congruence between the branching 
structure of the trees associated with each (Chapela et al. 1994; Hinkle et al. 1994; Schultz and Brady 
2008). The lineage structures of these two taxonomically divergent entities match up topologically, 88 
suggesting that their reproductive schedules are synchronized over long stretches of evolutionary 
time. It is also the case that the fungi associated with the higher attines are all very closely related, 
and probably comprise only one species. It has been suggested that the fungus has not speciated 
because it has only propagated clonally for several million years, reproducing exclusively asexually 
within nests and with the foundation of new ant colonies (North, Jackson, and Howse 1997, 386). 
Some other important details emerge from a closer look at the life cycle of a typical higher attine 
colony. A mature colony produces queens and males, which depart on nuptial flights that are 
coordinated with other colonies in the area. The females mate with one to ten males, depending on 
the species. Multiple matings decrease genetic relatedness within a successful colony, but this may be 
adaptive. It may be the case, for example, that the more genetically diverse a colony is the more 
disease resistant it is. It has also been suggested that multiple matings are required just for a queen to 
have an adequate supply of sperm to last her whole life. After all, she will be required to produce up 
to 200 million offspring over the colony’s life time. After mating, the males die. But their sperm stays 
alive in a specialized structure inside the queen called the spermatheca. Importantly, the queen also 
stores a small sample of the fungal mycelium from her nest of origin before she leaves on her 
nuptial flight. 
After locating a suitable nest site, the queen lands on the ground, sheds her wings, and digs a 
hole up to 30 centimeters into the ground. She extracts the fungus, which will serve as a starter 
culture for the nest as it grows. At this point, the queen begins to metabolize her wing muscles and 
fat deposits, and immediately begins laying eggs, most of which she eats. Some eggs are destined to 
develop into workers. The queen does not eat the fungus during this time, plausibly to ensure that it 
has a greater chance of proliferating within the nest site. Within a week or so, some of the eggs will 
have produced workers, some of whom begin to tend to the fungus garden and some of whom 
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fungus. Once the colony has achieved a threshold size, the queen relinquishes her duties to lay eggs 
full time, at which point the workers take on other essential somatic functions such as foraging, 
brood care, fungus gardening, expanding the nest, and protection of the colony (cf. Hölldobler and 
Wilson 2009, 412–425). 
The colony continues to grow in size, as does the fungus garden. A mature colony of the higher 
attines can cover tens of meters of area and can reach eight meters underground. It can consist of 
thousands of fungal chambers connected by thinner tunnels, the construction of which involve the 
excavation of tens of tons of dirt (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009, 457–458). There are also gigantic 
networks of trails surrounding the area near the underground nest that serve as highways upon 
which the workers that forage outside the nest transport the organic detritus back home (Hölldobler 
and Wilson 2009, 463–467; Moffett 2011, 174–179). 
A successful colony begins to produce winged males and females after a number of years, 
repeating the life cycle. 
Colonies of the higher attines have been referred to as the “ultimate superorganisms” for several 
reasons. Their colonies are very large, consisting of hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
individual ants. The various castes of the colony exhibit an unusually large degree of morphological 
diversity. There are large warriors, whose function is to protect the nest. The workers are of many 
different sizes, large and small, each with their own distinctive characteristics depending up their 
duties within the nest. The behavior of the workers is coordinated to a high degree, involving the 
collection of organic material from the area, processing of that material, cultivation of a fungus, 
tending the fungal garden, and trash removal. All of Wheeler’s “fundamental activities” of 
organismality, protection, nutrition, and reproduction, are exhibited unambiguously in the colonies 
of higher attine leaf cutter ants (see Wheeler 1911). 90 
As discussed, higher attines are also associated with an obligate symbiotic partner in the form of 
the Leucocoprinae fungus that they cultivate. It is therefore possible to recognize a colony-level 
holobiont entity, consisting of the ant colony in conjunction with its symbiotic fungal partner. This 
is an extension of the original holobiont concept, which is most often used to designate a macrobe 
and its associated microbes (Mindell 1992). An ant colony is not exactly a macrobe, but rather a group 
of conspecific macrobes, the traditional referent of the term “superorganism.” I propose that the 
concept of a holobiont might in general be used in colonial contexts to refer to the biological unit 
composed of all colony members as well as symbiotic partners with which they interact (cf. Gordon 
et al. 2013). A colonial holobiont of this kind can then be assessed with respect to its degree of 
organismality and its capacity to engage in evolutionary processes, just as a more traditional 
holobiont can. The remainder of this essay is devoted to assessing the organismality and 
evolutionary individuality of higher attine colonial holobionts. 
Myrmecologists have made good arguments to the effect that the ants in a higher attine colony 
exhibit features of organismal organization and complexity. The question before us now is whether 
or not the ants engage in interactions with their symbiotic fungal partner sufficient to ground a 
relation of holobiont organismality. I want to suggest that there are two kinds of cohesion relations 
between ants and their mutualistic fungal partner that ultimately give good reasons for thinking that 
the ant/fungus combination is an organism: metabolic relations and communicative relations. 
The basis for the relationship between attine ants and their fungal symbionts is nutritional. The 
fungi serve a crucial metabolic role for the ants inside the nest, allowing them access to certain kinds 
of carbon-based compounds from plants that would otherwise be unavailable. Recall that the ants 
harvest and process organic material from outside their nest and use it as a substrate upon which to 
grow fungus. The fungus metabolizes and assimilates polysaccharides from the plant matter, 
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ingested in a form that is nutritionally beneficial for the ants (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009, 420–
423). The metabolic relationship between the ants and the fungus is similar in some ways to that 
between human beings and their gut bacteria. Recall from “Symbiosis, Selection, and Individuality” 
that a human intestinal tract associates with many different species of bacteria and fungi, and that 
the symbionts make possible the digestion and uptake of plant polysaccharides (Booth 2014a). 
Something similar is happening in the ant/fungus holobiont, with the fungus playing the role of the 
gut microbes and the ants playing the role of the human. There are differences, of course; the 
fungus is not inside the ants, for example. Nevertheless there is a functional isomorphism between 
the two systems. Many biologists feel comfortable suggesting that a human/microorganism 
holobiont exhibits features of organismality due to metabolic relations. Similar kinds of relations 
plausibly ground the organismality of the ant/fungus holobiont. 
Metabolic relations are not the only forms of cohesion between ants and their symbiotic fungus; 
the partners also engage in signaling and communication. Ants learn to reject material that has been 
brought into the nest but is harmful for the fungus. The mechanisms underlying the fungal signals to 
the ants are not well understood, but it seems clear that signaling occurs and that the ants have 
evolved to understand it (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009, 445–447). This signaling system and its 
resulting behavior is adaptive for both partners in the symbiosis, and represents yet another way in 
which the cohesion of the ant/fungus holobiont is effected. 
I suggest that metabolic and communicative relations between the parts of a higher attine 
colonial holobiont are sufficient, at least prima facie, to ground the assertion that the holobiont 
operates as a tightly integrated organism, able to assimilate and processes substances from outside 
itself and to adjust to changing conditions from the environment. Attine colonies are organism-
individuals of the type I describe in “On the Theoretical Role of Biological Individuality.” 92 
The question before us now is whether or not a higher attine holobiont can rightly be 
considered an evolutionary individual. As I argue in a previous chapter, “Symbiosis, Selection, and 
Individuality,” despite the claims of some philosophers, not all holobionts should necessarily be 
understood as evolutionary individuals or units of selection (Booth 2014a). I suggest that the crucial 
factor is whether it is possible to understand different generations of holobionts as being linked by a 
process of community-level reproduction. In the previous chapter, I discuss the details of a case in 
which I argued that community-level reproduction occurs: the aphid/Buchnera holobiont. One 
crucial factor in that case involves the vertical transmission of the symbiont, which serves to 
synchronize the reproductive schedules of the bacterial and macrobial partners and results in 
congruence between the phylogenetic patterns of ancestry and descent between the symbiotic 
partners (cf. Mindell 1992). 
That colony-level reproduction occurs among ant colonies is relatively uncontroversial; 
descriptions of the process go back to some of the earliest characterizations of superorganisms 
(Wheeler 1911; Emerson 1939). Wheeler and Emerson explicitly compare a fertilized queen to a 
zygote, the unicellular initial cell from which an animal develops. The zygote is an example of a 
single-celled bottleneck between generations. Godfrey-Smith argues that intergenerational 
bottlenecks of this type sometimes indicate that the organisms that go through them are clear cases 
of reproducers, particularly when bottlenecks are found in conjunction with a pronounced division 
between germ and soma tissue, as well as on overall functional integration of the entity (Godfrey-
Smith 2009, 5.2). Godfrey-Smith’s framework is useful for thinking about the higher attines. The 
comparison between worker castes of a colony and the somatic cells of an animal, as well as that 
between the queen and the germ cells of an animal, have been discussed and are relatively 
uncontroversial (Wheeler 1911; Emerson 1939; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). Additionally, I argued 
above that functional integration is achieved among a holobiont via signaling and metabolism. I will 93 
therefore take it as established that a higher attine holobiont receives high scores on any criteria of 
functional integration and a distinction between germ tissue and soma tissue. I will, however, spend 
some time discussing bottlenecks and their role in the community-level reproduction of higher 
attine holobionts. 
According to Godfrey-Smith, bottlenecks need not be limited to single cells and are in principle 
a matter of degree (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 91). This is a good starting point. A fertilized queen is by 
no means a single-cell, but on a view in which individual ants are seen as analogues of cells of 
organisms, may be viewed as the analogue of one. Recall that a queen who is about to attempt the 
founding of a colony is holding sperm from several different males, as well as a starter fungal 
inoculum. She is thus in possession of all the necessary parts of a mature higher attine colony, but in 
very limited form. The sperm will ultimately fuse with eggs inside her, and give rise to sisters. The 
fungus will eventually proliferate and grow on a vegetative substrate, providing food for the colonial 
inhabitants. The queen represents a “narrowing” between generations of the kind that Godfrey-
Smith has in mind. She holds within herself the capacity to create millions of ants, just as a single 
cell holds within itself the capacity to mitotically divide into millions of cells. There is also a 
“narrowing” of sorts for the fungal part of the holobiont. In a mature colony the fungal cultivar is 
spread over several meters, throughout the nest. The inoculum brought by the queen is a very small 
portion of that larger entity. It is multicellular, but still small compared to its “parent” fungus. 
Bottleneckish phenomena are going on among both the ant and fungal parts of the holobiont. 
Another phenomenon of relevance is that the two parts of the holobiont travel together, 
ensuring vertical transmission of the fungal symbiont. The new nest is guaranteed to be associated 
with the same fungal cultivar that queen who founds the colony grew up with. There is thus 
maternal inheritance of the fungal symbiont among higher attine colonial holobionts. Recall that 
Buchnera are transmitted maternally and vertically in pea aphids, which are good examples of 94 
holobiont-level reproducers (Godfrey-Smith 2012; Booth 2014a). Analogous patterns can be found 
in attine colonies. Vertical transmission of symbionts encourages phylogenetic congruence between 
the parts of the holobiont, for which there is evidence in the higher attines (Chapela et al. 1994; 
Schultz and Brady 2008). Higher attine colonial holobionts are thus an interesting case of colonial 
reproduction. All members of the colony-level holobiont are included in a propagule that gives rise 
to the next generation. This suggests that colony-level reproduction is not limited to multicellular 
macrobes and their associated microbes, but can also occur among groups of conspecific macrobes 
and their associated microbial partner(s). 
The idea that higher attine colonies both exhibit the characteristics of organisms and have the 
capacity to participate in processes of natural selection is not entirely novel. However, the 
conceptual framework employed in this essay puts it among the most detailed and sustained 
defenses of the idea that higher attine colonial holobionts are biological individuals. There are 
several separate theses at play. Though the extension of the holobiont concept to ant colonies has 
been suggested before (see Gordon et al. 2013), it receives a detailed treatment in this essay. 
Moreover, the distinction between organisms and evolutionary individuals (elaborated in “On the 
Theoretical Roles of Biological Individuality”; cf. Godfrey-Smith 2012) is not one that has hitherto 
been applied to attine colonies. This distinction clarifies and taxonomizes different kinds of 
organismal cohesion exhibited by attine holobionts, such as communicative vs. metabolic cohesion. 
It also keeps distinct the different biological processes that colonies engage in, viz., organismal 
processes of persistence vs. lineage-creating and evolutionary processes. Attine colonies have 
previously been compared to large mammalian taxa, both in terms of the amount of vegetation they 
harvest and the similarity between the digestive capacities of their fungus gardens and a cow’s rumen 
(Moffett 2011, 174). This metabolic comparison is intriguing and I echo it here, but it is possible to 
go further. In particular, the defense of the idea that higher attine colonial holobionts engage in true 95 
and unambiguous processes of colony-level reproduction is perhaps the most important 
contribution of this essay. In “Symbiosis, Selection, and Individuality” I pointed out that many, 
perhaps most, symbiotic systems do not reproduce in a unified way. I make a new contribution by 
comparing the reproductive capacities of higher attine colonial holobionts to aphid/Buchnera 
holobionts, suggesting that these holobionts engage in collective reproduction (cf. Booth 2014a; 
Godfrey-Smith 2012). The obligate symbiosis between higher attines and their fungal cultivars is 
thus not only a noteworthy exemplar of a higher-level superorganismal reproducer, itself an unusual 
phenomenon, but one in which the reproducing entity is composed of parts derived from at least 
two distinct taxonomic kingdoms. Such a remarkable biological process and evolutionary outcome is 
certainly worthy of detailed theoretical discussion and development that has, in my view, been 
lacking. This essay fills the gap. 
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